PARTISAN PREFERENCES REGARDING DISCLOSURE MECHANISMS IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LEGISLATION by Karnovsky, Sonja
PARTISAN PREFERENCES REGARDING DISCLOSURE 
MECHANISMS IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LEGISLATION 
 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................  1 
BACKGROUND   ......................................................................................................................... 8 
The Use of Disclosure Mechanisms .....................................................................................................  8 
Expected Actions of Different Governments ................................................................................  23 
Evolution of Party Preferences Over Environmental Issues ................................................  27 
Ideological Differences Between Parties ........................................................................................ 35 
METHODS  ....................................................................................................................... 38 
ANALYSIS OF CASES ............................................................................................................... 45 
Hydraulic Fracturing Legislation in 2012 .....................................................................................  46 
Indiana HB 1107 ..............................................................................................................................  47 
Louisiana HB 957 ............................................................................................................................  50 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 ..................................................................................................................  52 
Hydraulic Fracturing Legislation in 2013 .....................................................................................  55 
Arkansas HB 2001 ..........................................................................................................................  59 
Illinois SB 1715 and 2155 ............................................................................................................ 62 
Rhode Island SB 725 ......................................................................................................................  68 
DISCUSSION OF EXOGENOUS FACTORS' IMPACT ON LEGISLATION ......................... 70 
2012 Legislation ........................................................................................................................................  70 
Indiana HB 1107 ..............................................................................................................................  70 
Louisiana HB 957 ............................................................................................................................  74 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 ..................................................................................................................  76 
Legislative Trends In 2012 .......................................................................................................... 79 
2013 Legislation ........................................................................................................................................  81 
Arkansas HB 2001 ..........................................................................................................................  82 
Illinois SB 1715 and 2155 ............................................................................................................ 85 
Rhode Island SB 725 ......................................................................................................................  89 
Legislative Trends In 2013 .........................................................................................................  91 
Legislative Trends Between Years ....................................................................................................  92 
A Lack of Non-Stringent Bills ...............................................................................................................  94 
CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................... 95 
REFERENCES  ..................................................................................................................... 100 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Hydraulic fracturing is a process of natural gas extraction that relies on 
pressurized water shot into underground wells that then brings trapped natural gas 
to the surface1. This method of natural gas extraction has been used in the United 
States throughout the 20th century 2. During this time period, hydraulic fracturing 
was limited to vertical hydraulic fracturing- a relatively less invasive method of 
natural gas extraction that relied on a single well drilled straight down through the 
water table3. The drawback of vertical hydraulic fracturing lies in its lack of 
versatility; it cannot reach more remote pockets of natural gas. To remedy this 
problem, the industry switched to horizontal hydraulic fracturing in the late 1990s4. 
This newer method relies on an initial vertical well, but it also utilizes a connected 
horizontal shaft that can pass through up to two miles of the water table5. It allows 
contractors to extract hard-to-reach pockets of natural gas but it also has a 
significantly higher risk for leakage of fracking fluid into groundwater supplies as 
well as ruptures along the longer well shaft.  
Horizontal hydraulic fracturing is a relatively new technique and it has been 
the subject of much debate among industry and environmentalist interests over the 
past decade. There has been a robust conversation around the topic in many parts of 
the country but no national consensus has been reached. The implementation of 
new horizontal drilling techniques has revitalized the industry by giving it access to 
                                                        
1 Valko, Peter, and Michael J. Economides. 2006. Hydraulic fracture mechanics. Texas A&M University. 
Concurrent Resolution Urging Congress to Clearly Delegate Responsibility for Regulating Hydraulic 
Fracturing to the States. SCR 12(, 2012): . 
2 Ibid. 1 
3 Ibid. 1 
4 Ibid. 1 
5 Ibid. 1 
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previously unviable stores of natural gas. With the advent of new techniques, 
legislation has had to address every aspect of the newly emerged industry. Industry 
experts argue that hydraulic fracturing will help the US reach its energy 
independence goals and switch a significant portion of its energy portfolio from coal 
to natural gas6. Environmentalist groups, both private and government entities, 
argue that the negative impact upon surrounding water supplies is too much of a 
burden to validate the practice of hydraulic fracturing7. There are also groups that 
make the more subtle argument that the impact of horizontal hydraulic fracturing is 
not sufficiently understood and the practice merits further study, though it may be 
viable in the future8. Hydraulic fracturing industry practices have evolved extremely 
rapidly in recent years but legislation has not yet caught up9. The argument follows 
that there is not sufficiently specific legislation regulating hydraulic fracturing 
because new practices are rapidly emerging and they are not yet common enough 
knowledge that legislators have addressed them.   
The debate around hydraulic fracturing is further complicated by the lack of 
cohesive national regulation on this subject. It demonstrates how states behave 
when there are no federal incentives or requirements on a popular, time-sensitive 
issue. More broadly, this issue demonstrates how state governments behave in the 
absence of federal control. This allows a greater range of actions because each state 
is free to decide for itself exactly how it would like to regulate hydraulic fracturing. 
                                                        
6 Law, B. E., and C. W. Spencer. 1993. Gas in tight reservoirs - an emerging major source of 
energy. United States Geological Survey, Professional Paper 1570. 
7 Ibid. 6 
8 Ibid. 6 
9 Ibid. 6 
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Different governments’ responses to hydraulic fracturing in different parts of the 
country may diverge from expected partisan preferences on this issue. There are 
myriad environmental and economic issues that may supersede predicted behavior. 
State-level control of this issue  allows individual governments more freedom to 
pursue varied solutions to the issue. Thus, predictions can be made about expected 
actions of different partisan governments but these must be made with the 
understanding that variation from expected preferences is more likely than on 
issues where there is cohesive national regulation.  
 Hydraulic fracturing wells are mentioned as an exemption in the Clean 
Water Act but otherwise the national government has largely left this issue to the 
states to legislate10. Many environmental issues, such as clean air or water, are 
overseen by broad national acts11. Under the umbrella of federal legislation, states 
have some freedom to pass their own regulations. These regulations vary between 
states but they are all bound by the terms set forth in the federal laws in terms of 
which issues states can address and to what extent12. In the absence of federal 
regulation, all issues pertinent to hydraulic fracturing are left to the states. For 
example, states may make rules about emissions into the air or pollution in water 
but only around specific standards, such as the allowable parts per million of certain 
chemicals released into the air13. They cannot however make regulations that 
contradict national laws. Hydraulic fracturing does not have such restrictions. State 
                                                        
10 Shlyapobersky, J. 1985. The energy of hydraulic fracturing. Paper presented at The 26th U.S. 
Symposium on Rock Mechanics (USRMS), Rapid City, SD. 
11 Jennings, Randolph, and Committee on Environment and Public Works. 1979. Legislative history of 
the clean air act amendments of 1977: A continuation of the clean air act amendments of 1970 : 
Together with a section-by-section index (1979)  . Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676. 
12 Ibid. 11 
13 Ibid. 11 
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regulations may address any topic pertaining to hydraulic fracturing, including but 
certainly not limited to well depth or location, fracking fluid composition, distance 
from residences, permitting, notifications to landowners, procedures to contest well 
placement, etc. This freedom has resulted is state legislation that varies widely 
between states in terms of issues addressed and how strictly these issues are 
monitored.  
The patchwork of state legislation has created a slew of problems for both 
sides of the hydraulic fracturing debate. There is no national standard to govern the 
placement or density of hydraulic fracturing wells, the disclosure of chemicals in 
fracking fluid, or negotiations for land use in hydraulic fracturing operations. All 
these issues have been dealt with in unique ways by each state that currently has 
legislation dealing with hydraulic fracturing on the books or under consideration. 
There is a connection between the political makeup of a state’s legislature and the 
particular approach it has taken in regulating hydraulic fracturing.  
Hydraulic fracturing legislation can be divided broadly into three categories: 
information disclosure mechanisms, technical regulations, and human impacts. 
Information disclosure legislation seeks to collect information about the hydraulic 
fracturing process. Some information disclosure provisions collect this data in 
publicly available databases managed by the state or by extra-governmental groups. 
Other information disclosure mechanisms may simply collect the information for 
the government’s purposes. Disclosure legislation may be linked with other 
regulations that dictate what can be done with the newly available information and 
by whom. For example, some bills give private citizens access to information and 
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give them the right to sue industry for violation or use the information to stop 
intended actions. Information disclosure provisions are not inherently partisan. 
They may sometimes be linked to philosophically Democratic goals, such as making 
information more publicly available or increasing accountability for industry, but 
this is not a rigorous link that should always be assumed to be true. Information 
disclosure merely collects information; if this process yields information that proves 
the hydraulic fracturing process does not pollute or is in other ways not harmful to 
the environment then information disclosure may well serve to increase support for 
hydraulic fracturing. Partisan preferences over disclosure mechanisms are more 
closely linked to what is done with the information once it is collected, not the act 
itself of collecting information.  
Technical regulations address scientific questions endemic to the process of 
hydraulic fracturing. Different states may pass bills that dictate a well’s location, it’s 
depth, how long it may be in operation for,  what chemicals may be used in fracking 
fluid and in what concentrations, etc. These regulations are not inherently linked to 
any preferences over the hydraulic fracturing process nor can they be attributed 
clearly to one party over another.  
Legislation regarding hydraulic fracturing may also be focused at addressing 
the impact upon existing communities caused by hydraulic fracturing. This can be 
accomplished through legislative provisions such as the necessity of giving notice to 
surface land owners before drilling or setting up a process for property owners to 
respond to proposed locations. There can also be some overlap with other types of 
hydraulic fracturing legislation. For example, well location may be considered both 
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technical and human impact, or how long a well may operate, or what is contained 
within fracking fluid. Human impact provisions may also overlap with disclosure 
mechanisms. The steps beyond collecting information may be aimed at allowing 
private citizens to advocate for themselves in the face of proposed or existing 
hydraulic fracturing legislation. This type of legislation is the most clearly aligned 
with a specific goal in response to hydraulic fracturing: it minimizes impact on 
people. This is usually linked to halting or reducing hydraulic fracturing operations. 
As discussed, this is predicted to be a preference more for Democrats than 
Republicans. 
This study will examine the legislation passed by different partisan 
governments related to hydraulic fracturing that deals specifically with disclosure 
mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing. This has become a particularly contentious 
point in the debate over the future of hydraulic fracturing more broadly in the 
country. Legislators disagree over what information should be disclosed and what 
should be done with this information afterward. Disclosure is largely aimed at 
gathering information about the technical factors that government may or may not 
regulate through a different type of legislation and then disclosing this information 
to the public in some way.  
This study will investigate different states’ approaches to governing 
hydraulic fracturing. It will take a robust sample of enacted legislation from 
Democrat and Republican-controlled governments as well as mixed-control 
governments and evaluate what disclosure mechanisms it includes to regulate 
hydraulic fracturing. It will discuss briefly different types of legislation relating to 
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hydraulic fracturing but the primary focus of the study will be on legislation that 
deals with mandatory disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing legislation. 
Disclosure was chosen to analyze because it has recently come to the fore of the 
debate over hydraulic fracturing. This new avenue for regulating hydraulic 
fracturing is nuanced; it deals with how to disclose information and to whom, what 
information should be shared, and what should be done with the information once it 
has been obtained. There are also numerous bills that deal with disclosure 
provisions from recent years that offer a sufficiently large sample to analyze across 
cases and draw conclusions about observed patterns, specifically regarding partisan 
preferences.  
The study will seek to test the following propositions. If Democrats are more 
likely to support environmental issues than are Republicans and disclosure 
mechanisms in environmental legislation benefit the environment then it follows 
that Democrat-led governments are more likely to pass bills that include disclosure 
mechanisms in environmental legislation than are Republican-led governments. 
Furthermore, if horizontal hydraulic fracturing is detrimental to the environment 
then it follows that Democratic governments are more likely to pass legislation with 
disclosure mechanisms pertaining to hydraulic fracturing than are Republican 
governments in order to mitigate the harm inherent to horizontal hydraulic 
fracturing. Finally, if states that are controlled in both houses and the governor’s 
seat by one party pass more legislation overall and states controlled in both houses 
and the governor’s seat by Democrats pass legislation pertaining to hydraulic 
fracturing that includes disclosure mechanisms more frequently than any other 
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states then it follows that states controlled entirely by Democrats will pass more 
legislation pertaining to hydraulic fracturing that includes disclosure mechanisms 
than states controlled by a mixture of Democrats and Republicans.  
BACKGROUND 
THE USE OF DISCLOSURE MECHANISMS 
Politicians frequently disagree over what should be included in 
environmental legislation. The most controversial part of this dispute lies in the 
uncertainty over how much power such legislation should have. Politicians at all 
levels of government disagree about how much power legislative acts should have 
to regulate industry or compel certain actions from private entities14. Democrats 
and Republicans increasingly fall on opposite sides of this debate with each party 
moving toward extreme positions15. One of the most common attempts to allow 
legislation to oversee private actors is the inclusion of disclosure mechanisms, 
specifically disclosure mandates for private entities that are intended to prevent 
environmental harms16. These mechanisms are particularly controversial because 
they allow government to dictate the actions of the market and because they seek to 
do so to accomplish a goal- to protect the environment- that many legislators do not 
stand behind17. It follows that Democrats and Republicans may disagree on the use 
of disclosure mechanisms.  
                                                        
14 Pew Research Center. 2013. Views of government: Key data points. Pew Research. 
15 Carson, Jaime, Gregory Koger, Matthew J. Lebo, and Everett Young. 2010. The electoral 
consequences of party loyalty in congress. American Journal of Political Science 54 : 598,598-616. 
16 Buhr, Nola. 1998. Environmental performance, legislation and annual report disclosure: The case 
of acid rain and Falconbridge. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal 11 (2): 163. 
17 Ibid. 16 
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Disclosure mechanisms have been a standard tool in corporate negotiations 
between managers and shareholders for some time. Most large companies maintain 
certain transparency requirements that mandate regular reports to stockholders18. 
The necessity of corporate disclosure to investors has become an accepted practice 
in the private sector. At the same time, disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic 
fracturing legislation are the subject of close scrutiny19. Many legislators argue that 
disclosure mechanisms represent an untoward intervention of government 
authority20. The inclusion of disclosure mechanisms has accordingly been contested 
in environmental legislation. 
Disclosure mechanisms for industry and politics share some similarities in 
the methods that they use to compel transparency from different actors. Disclosure 
mechanisms are defined simply as any tool that results in information being made 
available to the public, in both the public and private sectors. The particular 
methods used to compel this information to be made public vary widely. In 
environmental legislation, disclosure mechanisms often take the form of mandatory 
reporting; the government sets parameters for information that industry must share 
with it21. Then, depending on the disclosure provision in question this information 
may be logged in a private government database or incorporated in an existing 
                                                        
18 Silva da Rosa, Fabricia; Rolim Ensslin, Sandra; Ensslin, Leonardo; and Joao Lunkes, Rogério. 2012. 
Environmental disclosure management: A constructivist case. Management Decision 50 (6): 1117-
36. 
19 Fritzemeyer, J. R., & Carmichael, D. R. (1972). Environmental disclosures. Journal of Accountancy 
(Pre-1986), 133(000003), 76. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview/198260804?accountid=14667 
20 Wegener, Matt, Elayan Fayez A., Sandra Felton, and Jingyu and Li. 2013. Factors influencing 
corporate environmental disclosures. Accounting Perspectives 12 (1). 
21 Ibid. 19 
 10 
database of some sort22. Disclosed information may also be made public23. This is 
not always the case with disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing legislation. 
There is expected variation in what is done with information after it is disclosed to 
the government and also what effect information may have if it is made public. 
Disclosure on its face seems to be a tool that could be used to bring to light harmful 
industry practices that have a negative environmental impact24. However it may be 
the case that the information disclosed demonstrates that industry practices are in 
fact benign, in which case it may increase support for industry25. Information 
disclosure does not have an inherent mission with regard to halting or encouraging 
industry practices; this intent must be interpreted later based upon what the 
information reveals and whether this information is later made public.  
In both the public and private sectors, mandatory disclosure is written into 
governing text, whether corporate guidelines or legislation. This mandatory 
disclosure seeks to change corporations’ reporting actions to a point of greater 
transparency to either private industry or the government. This can be done either 
through independent registries that compile data from all reporting parties or 
through industry-set standards that all actors must comply with.  
Disclosure has become a popular mechanism to ensure compliance in  
different political spheres. It is often implemented as a policy tool with the 
assumption that citizens have an incentive to act upon perceived harms that are 
                                                        
22 Ibid. 19 
23 Ibid. 19 
24 Ibid. 19 
25 Ibid. 19 
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revealed through disclosure while industry does not have this same incentive26. This 
is made with the additional assumption that the information is made public after it 
is disclosed to the government27. Thus, it can be interpreted as a system of 
government regulation intended to compel private industry change through private 
citizen action. However, corporate actors may also have an incentive to act upon 
newly discovered harms of their own accord, rather than relying on citizens’ 
coercion28. This may improve the public perception of the corporate actor and 
mitigate fallout from the disclosure of damaging information. If this is the case, it is 
not accurate to describe disclosure mechanisms as an attempt to influence private 
industry action because industry is voluntarily participating.  
Economic regulation provides robust examples of government-mandated 
disclosure mechanisms that have influenced industry behavior and pubic 
perception29. Disclosure mechanisms can compel additional information from 
various private sectors and enhance effective governance by improving public 
perceptions of leaders.30 The newly available information improves the public’s 
trust in the particular industry and thus can benefit both government and 
industry31. This is not to say that disclosure uniformly benefits government or 
industry. If the mandatory disclosure reveals negative information it can harm 
                                                        
26 Kraft, Michael, Mark Stephan, and Troy Abel. 2011. Coming clean: Information disclosure and 
environmental performance (American and comparative environmental policy) The MIT Press. 
27 Ibid. 26 
28 Ibid. 26 
29 Pacific Media and Communications Facility. 2006. Information disclosure policy: A toolkit for pacific 
governments. 
30 Ibid. 29 
31 Ibid. 29 
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public perception. However, increased transparency may mitigate harm over time32. 
Furthermore, once disclosure mechanisms are in place they improve perception of 
the industry over time33.  
In recent years, information disclosure has been examined as a policy 
strategy specifically for environmental protection34. This new approach has moved 
away from the previous command-and-control regulatory scheme in favor of a 
bolder approach that does not allow government and industry to focus on meeting 
only minimal standards35.  Command and control was the accepted practice for 
many years. This regulatory scheme was centered on the government handing down 
regulations and then policing industry actors’ compliance36. Since the 1970s this has 
been considered the most effective method of regulation to prevent environmental 
degradation37. However, command and control relied on a growing number of 
regulations over time to ensure compliance from industry38. This increasingly 
complex regulation became politically disadvantageous over time, particularly 
among Republicans39. Thus, environmental regulation has sought new methods of 
monitoring industry actions and safeguarding environmental protections.  
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) represents a new direction for 
environmental regulation. The TRI is a publicly available registry that companies 
                                                        
32 Ibid. 29 
33 Ibid. 29 
34 Ibid. 26 
35 Ibid. 26 
36 Ibid. 26 
37 Harrington, Winston, and Richard Morgenstern. 2004. Economic incentives versus command and 
control: What's the best approach for solving environmental problems? . Resources for the 
Future Fall/Winter. 
38 Ibid. 37 
39 Ibid. 37 
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must use to record their emissions of various substances40. This tool demonstrates 
that information disclosure can have a large impact on the environmental 
performance of a particular industry41. Highly polluting industries had a largely 
negative response to the TRI whereas less polluting industries took a more 
measured approach42.  This can likely be attributed to the relative amounts of work 
that different industries would have to do to comply with regulations and public 
expectations after their actions are made clear through disclosure in the TRI. 
Though the TRI shows some variability in the performance of individual locations, it 
demonstrates a clear overall pattern of reduced pollution that can be attributed to 
the TRI method of mandatory information disclosure43. This method of reporting 
and recording emissions has transformed environmental protection from a scenario 
where government and industry strive only to meet minimum requirements to one 
where it is advantageous to be a leader in ecofriendly behavior.  
The variability that is endemic to TRI reporting is not an indictment of 
information disclosure in environmental legislation44. Instead it suggests that the 
most successful strategy to compel environmentally friendly behavior will use a 
combination of traditional command-and-control and information disclosure 
techniques45. Disclosure can be successful on its own but a combination of 
techniques leads to the best outcome for environmental protection. This will allow 
                                                        
40 Ibid. 26  
41 Ibid. 26 
42 Ibid. 26 
43 Ibid. 26 
44 Ibid. 26 
45 Ibid. 26 
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different types of organizations to combine methods of pollution reduction for a 
minimum impact on business with a maximum benefit to the environment. 
The TRI is a tool that can be used by legislators who seek to learn more 
information about industry practices, in this case hydraulic fracturing46. Support 
and opposition to the TRI do not fall cleanly along partisan lines. Some legislators 
praise the system as a step forward in documenting environmental damages in an 
organized manner47. Others oppose the system because they do not believe that 
there should be reporting requirements placed upon industry actors48. A different 
branch of opposition suggests that the TRI is an ineffective disclosure mechanism 
because companies report their own emissions and they are allowed to approximate 
the information rather than having to document it49. The TRI has not been 
universally well received, with people offering suggestions to either increase or 
reduce its impact upon industry. This system does indisputably represent a move 
away from traditional command and control legislation toward a new realm of 
disclosure provisions for environmental regulation.  
In order for disclosure to be a useful tool, there must exist a publicly 
accessible location for information storage.50 FracFocus is one publicly available 
                                                        
46 Belliveau, Mike. 2010. Healthy states: Protecting families from toxic chemicals while congress lags 
behind. 
47 Ibid. 46 
48 Ibid. 46 
49 Ibid. 46 
50 Kraft, Michael. 2014. Using information disclosure to achieve policy goals: How experience with 
the toxics release inventory can inform action on natural gas fracturing. CLOSUP Issues in Energy 
and Environmental Policy 6. 
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database where industry actors can voluntarily report information51. This database 
has become representative of information disclosure and many states rely on it as a 
baseline for disclosure legislation52. There is no mandatory compulsion to report 
information to FracFocus, which has been criticized because it severely limits the 
information available to the public53. There have also been complaints about the 
accessibility and comprehensibility of FracFocus; some groups make the case that 
the database serves little to no use because people do not know how to access 
information they need54. Some states have sought an alternative solution by creating 
their own databases, managed by the state government55. This method allows for 
more control over the setup of the database and the rules for reporting information 
in it56. Individual state-managed databases can face opposition because they create 
more work in oversight, enforcement, and upkeep for the government. Mandatory 
reporting can also be politically contentious. Currently, FracFocus remains the only 
nationally recognized database for disclosure of hydraulic fracturing information57.  
It is no coincidence, then, that highly polluting industries stand to lose the 
most from the implementation of disclosure mechanisms in environmental 
legislation. By its nature, the inclusion of mandatory disclosure increases 
transparency in a given industry58. When more light is shed on an industry, public 
                                                        
51 Konschnik, Kate, Margaret Holden, and Alexa Shasteen. 2013. Legal fractures in chemical 
disclosure laws: Why the voluntary chemical disclosure registry FracFocus fails as a regulatory 
compliance tool. Harvard Law School Environmental Law Program Policy Initiative. 
52 Ibid. 51 
53 Ibid. 51 
54 Ibid. 51 
55 Ibid. 51 
56 Ibid. 51 
57 Ibid. 51 
58 Ibid. 20 
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outcry often demands that action be taken to change industry practices and reduce 
harm to the environment59.  This in turn places a burden upon industry and requires 
a change in their established practices, which is at best inconvenient and at worst 
quite costly60. It can be inferred from this pattern that public disclosure leads to 
more environmental protections, if only in deference to public opinion.  
Industry actors have largely exhibited opposition to environmental 
regulation61. Their primary interest lies in continuing business practices in the most 
profitable manner and this is often incompatible with the restriction inherent to 
environmental regulation62. However, there has been some support from industry 
actors  for the TRI or similar voluntary reporting disclosure mechanisms63. This can 
be seen through their compliance in self-reporting to the TRI database64. Voluntary 
disclosure itself has less of an impact on industry action than command and control 
regulations, which likely explains the support that some industry actors have shown 
for the TRI65. There is certainly variation among companies of different sizes, from 
different industries, with different outlooks on the environment, etc. but the stated 
preferences generally hold true for most corporate interests66.  
Pushback against environmental legislation and variability in reduction of 
environmental harms through different regulatory schemes has been especially 
                                                        
59 Ibid. 19 
60 Ibid. 19 
61 Ibid. 19 
62 Ibid. 19 
63 Ibid. 26 
64 Ibid. 26 
65 Ibid. 26 
66 Ibid. 46 
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problematic within industries that are more prone to pollution67. Generally, self-
reporting and support for mandatory disclosure are highest among industries that 
have low incidence of pollution68. This is certainly beneficial in increasing overall 
publicity and support for the proposed measures but it has markedly less impact in 
measurably reducing pollution. Naturally, industries that are likely to support 
disclosure mechanisms are also those that least need them69. Part of the opposition 
to disclosure mechanisms lies not in opposition to the actions that they mandate but 
rather a fear of what mandated actions might be forced upon them afterward70. 
Companies in highly polluting industries are loath to open the door to government 
oversight because this may lead to more government mandates. These mandates are 
often costly and difficult to comply with, so industries that pollute the most have a 
natural incentive to disclose, out of fear that the government may later force even 
stricter, more costly regulations71. This fear must be weighed against the higher 
disincentive  that polluting industries have against disclosure for fear of immediate 
public or governmental backlash in response to the information they release.  
Disclosure is a useful policy tool when discussing hydraulic fracturing 
because it helps to alleviate some of the public and expert uncertainty about the 
scientific practices involved72. It can reveal information regarding well depth and 
location, duration of hydraulic fracturing operations, chemicals in fracking fluid, 
                                                        
67 Ibid. 20 
68 Ibid. 20 
69 Ibid. 20 
70 Ibid. 18 
71 Ibid. 18 
72 Gosman, Sara. 2013. Reflecting risk: Chemical disclosure and hydraulic fracturing. Public Law and 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series paper no 324. 
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etc.73. Disclosure is lauded as a cost effective tool that increases public knowledge 
and safety while also empowering individuals and legislators to make the best 
possible decisions for themselves or their constituents respectively74. Disclosure is 
also beneficial because it improves the lawmaking process by putting individuals 
who now have a “right to know” on more equal footing with industry 
representatives and thus improving the information that legislators receive from all 
sides of this debate75. This method cannot itself compel action toward 
environmental protection76. Disclosure merely gathers information; it must be 
paired with other legislative provisions that either make the information public or 
give individuals or extra-governmental groups the right to seek out the information 
and act on it to change industry action77.  
However, disclosure can be problematic if there is an unacceptable level of 
industry knowledge to satisfy demands for information78. If the requisite knowledge 
cannot be obtained, the amount of information generated through disclosure may 
not respond well to long-term uncertainty about the health and environmental 
effects of the activity79. Information disclosure can be difficult with any issue, but 
especially with environmental issues, where technology and industry practices are 
rapidly changing- such as hydraulic fracturing. Thus, a bill with disclosure 
mechanisms may not substantially increase citizens’ knowledge about hydraulic 
fracturing activities or have a positive effect on their physical or community 
                                                        
73 Ibid. 72 
74 Ibid. 72  
75 Ibid. 72 
76 Ibid. 72 
77 Ibid. 72 
78 Ibid. 72 
79 Ibid. 72 
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health80. The consideration of available information about hydraulic fracturing 
should not be interpreted as a condemnation of disclosure with regard to hydraulic 
fracturing. Rather, this serves as a reminder that disclosure must be considered in 
the context of information available to industry experts when assessing its efficacy.  
The connection between disclosure mechanisms and environmental 
protection is not an ironclad link that can always be assumed to be true. Disclosure 
mechanisms simply compel transparency81. The compulsion toward more stringent 
environmental management is entirely dependent upon the context of the 
disclosure mechanism and whether it is paired with further provisions that make 
the information public or empower people to take legislative action. Disclosure 
mechanisms have often been included in legislation dealing with corporate research 
and development, arguably before their inclusion in environmental legislation82. In a 
non-environmental context, disclosure mechanisms sought to ensure equitable 
business practices and prevent illegal activity around trading, research and 
development, or other areas of business83. Disclosure may also simply collect 
information about environmental harms84. This must be paired with provisions such 
as private citizens’ right to sue based upon violations discovered through disclosure 
in order to have an impact in preventing environmental harm85. There was no 
inherent link to environmental responsibility and it is erroneous to draw one. 
                                                        
80 Ibid. 72 
81 Ibid. 20 
82 Entwistle, Gary M. 1999. Exploring the R&D disclosure environment. Accounting Horizons 13 (4) 
(Dec 1999): 323-41. 
83 Ibid. 82 
84 Ibid. 72 
85 Ibid. 72 
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Mandatory disclosure provisions in environmental legislation are a tool 
aimed at increasing awareness, and even action, to achieve environmental 
protections. If this comparison is simplified, it follows that disclosure mechanisms in 
environmental legislation will benefit the environment. Some government actors 
apply disclosure to environmental policy to strengthen the content of the bill 
without requiring extensive regulatory or permitting systems that call for 
substantial government action86. Disclosure mechanisms are perhaps a more 
appealing regulatory tool to politicians that still result in legislation that improves 
environmental protections.  
The inclusion of disclosure mechanisms results in a stronger piece of 
legislation in a variety of ways. Disclosure increases the availability of information 
on pollution and emissions as a result of industry practices87 . Disclosure can occur 
either through government-enforced information retrieval or through mandatory 
self-reporting88. Both methods are effective in different situations, often dependent 
upon the industry in question. Specifically, industries that are more reticent are 
often bigger polluters or harm the environment in some other way, thus disclosure 
of any kind is more harmful to them89. Thus, it is fair to assume that highly polluting 
industries that are resistant to disclosure mandates may require government-
enforced information retrieval if the public is to gain a full understanding of the 
environmental practices that the industry engages in.  
                                                        
86 Ibid. 18 
87 Anbumozhi, Venkatachalam, Qwanruedee Chotichanathawewong, and Thirumalainambi Murugesh. 
2011. Information disclosure strategies for green industries   . Asian Development Bank 
Institute(305). 
88 Ibid. 87 
89 Ibid. 87 
 21 
Disclosure need not always take the form of reporting, whether voluntary or 
mandatory. It can also be a solely governmental action that impacts a given industry, 
such as mandatory labeling90.  In this context, the government compels industry to 
release some information and then distils this information and creates a system to 
codify it and easily present it to consumers91. When the government releases the 
information directly to the public without any further action mandated from 
industry actors, disclosure is not directly harmful to industry but rather it is entirely 
dependent upon the public’s reaction to the disclosed information.  
Disclosure has been linked with increasing levels of oversight in 
environmental legislation, which contributes to the perception that disclosure 
“strengthens” a bill. This occurs when disclosure is paired with other legislative 
provisions that make information public or in other ways allow people to act upon 
the information revealed92. If the inclusion of disclosure mechanisms “strengthens” 
an environmental bill it must be considered what constitutes a “strong” bill. If the 
premise is accepted that disclosure in environmental legislation is beneficial to the 
environment then it follows that bills that contain disclosure mechanisms result in 
more stringent environmental standards and by extension more expansive 
environmental protections. By these metrics, bills that are more protective of the 
environment should be considered “stronger”.  
Furthermore, if it is accepted that disclosure mechanisms strengthen 
environmental legislation by benefitting the environment more than legislation that 
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does not include such provisions then it also follows that groups that support 
environmental protection would advocate for disclosure mechanisms. While the 
Democratic Party is less clearly aligned with environmentalism than groups whose 
sole mission is environmental protection, the Party also falls within the camp that 
supports disclosure mechanisms in environmental legislation93. This is not to say 
that the Democratic Party is a homogenous group that uniformly supports all 
disclosure in environmental legislation. Further, this is not to say that Republicans 
uniformly dislike disclosure in environmental legislation94. Indeed, individual 
members of both parties have explicitly gone against these average preferences over 
environmental protections95. It is only appropriate to comment on the median 
viewpoint of the Democratic and Republican Parties regarding disclosure in 
environmental legislation: the Democratic Party supports, on average, a wider 
variety of disclosure in environmental legislation and it does so more frequently 
than its Republican counterpart.  
Both Democrats and Republicans may support disclosure in different 
legislation. It is erroneous to assume that because Democrats tend to support more 
disclosure in environmental legislation that Republicans that these preferences will 
transfer to other areas of policy. It is more accurate to examine specific factors, 
particularly the political climate surrounding a given issue, to determine party 
preferences over disclosure on a case-by-case basis. The conclusions drawn apply 
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only to the median opinions among Democrats and Republicans toward information 
disclosure regarding environmental legislations.  
EXPECTED ACTIONS OF DIFFERENT GOVERNMENTS 
It has been discussed that Democrats are more likely to support disclosure 
mechanisms in environmental legislation than Republicans. It follows logically that 
governments controlled by Democrats are more likely to propose and pass 
environmental legislation that contains disclosure mechanisms than are 
governments controlled by Republicans. Democrats frequently support more 
expansive environmental protections that call for relatively high government 
involvement and thus support stronger environmental legislation, which often 
includes disclosure mechanisms. Republicans support the opposite: less 
environmental regulation, less government action, and correspondingly weak 
environmental legislation without disclosure mechanisms. When either party 
controls a government it will more often pass its preferred type of legislation.  
These predictions over preferences apply on both national and state levels. 
On a broad national level, this expected behavior will apply in many cases. It is less 
predictable on a state level. There are differences between state-level parties that 
may invalidate predicted behavior. It is to be expected that some states will be more 
liberal or conservative than others, even if the same party controls them. The 
preferences that have been discussed for Democrats and Republicans refer to the 
parties on a national level and should be considered a median for both parties’ 
behavior, with anticipated variation from hypothetical preferences.  
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Thus, Democrat or Republican-controlled governments at any level of 
government will not always pass stringent or non-stringent environmental 
legislation respectively. A spectrum of opinion exists within either party that 
informs its decision-making. It is to be expected that extreme legislators on either 
end of the spectrum may advocate either for legislation that more closely aligns with 
their opponent party’s stances or legislation that is more radical than what the 
majority of the party supports. In either case, these extreme opinions may halt a 
legislature or force it to pass more moderate legislation than what might be 
expected based upon its theoretical preferences. 
It is also necessary to consider the effect that split governments have on the 
type of legislation passed. Every state but one in the US has a bicameral state 
legislature split between a lower house- a General Assembly or a House of 
Representatives- and an upper house- a Senate. The only exception to this rule is 
Nebraska, which has a unicameral, non–partisan Senate. In addition to their 
legislative branches, the states also have a partisan governor who must sign off on 
proposed legislation. Nationally, a fairly equal distribution of states are entirely 
controlled by Democrats or Republicans and those that have some combination of 
the two major parties controlling different branches of the state legislature.  
In recent years, there has been a trend toward more split-party control of 
legislatures96. This is a relatively recent phenomenon that has emerged in the past 
decade and it coincides closely with reemergence of legislation pertaining to 
                                                        
96 Goodman, Josh. 2013. 2013: A year of big majorities. Stateline: The Daily News Service of the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, January 22, 2013, 2013. 
 25 
hydraulic fracturing97. Thus, it is likely that many, states had split-party control of 
their legislature in the early years during which they were considering hydraulic 
fracturing legislation. This trend has seen a reversal in the past few years, so a single 
party may now control legislatures that were previously split98. This trend played 
itself out in broad waves of support for Democrats in 2008 and then Republicans in 
201099. Both parties had significant wins at all levels of government during their 
respective years100. These trends led to more state governments under the control 
of only one party.  
The differences in the type of legislation passed by states that are uniformly 
controlled by one party and those that are not can be compared to the effect of 
“safe” seats on legislation. “Safe” seats are analogous to states that are controlled by 
one party in both houses and the governor’s seat. Both cases result in less 
opposition from the minority party. Thus the majority can move in a direction 
further to the left or the right, with all-Democratic states generally trending to the 
left and all-Republican states generally trending to the right101. This occurs because 
the dominance of one party allows for more extreme positions, usually a reflection 
of public preferences that are more extreme than a given national party’s 
platform102. This effect is further magnified when the same party also controls the 
governor’s seat103. When one party controls all three entities it is able to pass 
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generally a large volume of legislation and specifically legislation that is further to 
the left or right than what would be expected from split party governments104. 
States that have split legislatures, or uniform legislatures but a governor of a 
different party, tend to pass more centrist legislation. The variety of positions that 
legislators take pushes most bills to the middle on a given issue105. It is to be 
expected that split legislatures offer more pushback from both parties on 
legislation106. There exists in these states a large natural incentive to compromise in 
order to achieve legislative goals107. Thus, a bill that makes it out of both houses of 
the split legislature is more likely reflect the majority’s opinion from each house and 
fall in the middle of an issue rather than trend to either extreme108.  
When the same party controls both houses but the opposite party holds the 
governor’s seat there is also some amount of pushback on proposed legislation. 
However, the governor cannot on paper offer the same amount of feedback on a bill 
that a legislative body can, nor can she propose a new bill of her own, so by 
necessity this pushback is offered less frequently109. There is some expected 
variation in this general conclusion in the histories of individual states due to a 
particularly strong executive. Further, there is variation between states due to the 
relative differences in authority that various states’ legislatures hold. A governor has 
veto power but it is not used the same way as a branch of the legislature can oppose 
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legislation it does not agree with110. Thus, a state where one party has unilateral 
control of both houses of the legislature will pass more legislation that is further to 
the left or the right- depending on which party holds the majority- than one where 
control of the two houses is split between Democrats and Republicans111. 
Furthermore, states where control of either legislative body or the governor’s seat is 
split between the two major parties will pass fewer bills than states where one party 
controls both the legislative and executive branches.112 These trends indicate that 
unilateral control of a state’s government will allow the majority party to pass more 
extreme legislation than what is passed in states with split party governments.  
EVOLUTION OF PARTY PREFERENCES OVER ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
Over time, a pattern regarding environmental regulation has emerged: it has 
become more stringent and preventative of perceived environmental threats113. 
This pattern is limited to the scope of issues that environmental legislation 
addresses; as public knowledge of environmental hams has increased, there are 
more known issues that can be regulated and specifically more that the public 
supports regulating.  With this shift toward more regulation there has also been a 
shift in party support of environmental issues toward a sharp divide along party 
lines. At the beginning of the twentieth century, both major parties had leaders who 
supported environmental causes- as they were defined in that era 114. These leaders 
serve as a proxy for the median opinions that their parties espoused at the time. 
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Individual politicians from a party may have held divergent opinions, and even 
entire state parties may have differed from their national branch. However, the 
party leaders serve as a useful proxy to understand the broad opinions of the party 
in a given time period. This status quo of focusing on specific environmental issues 
at the state and federal levels, often centered around land preservation or small-
scale pollution cleanup, continued until the 1960s, when the public began to place a 
much greater emphasis on environmental protections, specifically the regulation of 
air and water pollution115. 
Trending preferences for and against environmental regulations among 
Democrats and Republicans respectively describe shifts in behavior over time for 
the national parties. These preferences cannot be applied in every case to state level 
parties. However, it is useful to use the national party as a proxy for the median 
opinion among all state-level parties. That is to say, certain states’ Republican or 
Democratic parties may differ from the national parties on given issues but an 
aggregation of all state level parties’ opinions on a given issue will closely 
approximate the national party’s stance. If a certain party differs drastically from 
the national party on an issue this is worth noting, but otherwise it is fair to assume 
that the state party follows the outline set forth by the national party’s platform.  
There is no single definitive answer as to why the environment was shifted to 
the left side of the aisle and not the right. Potentially, this directional shift occurred 
because new environmental protections required an increased federal or state 
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government presence116. Baseline environmental protections were first included in 
US law in the beginning of the twentieth century117. Over time more legislation has 
been passed that increased the scope and breadth of protections offered118. Early 
legislation in this field codified simple environmental protections and required little 
government action but naturally things have grown more complicated with time119. 
Thus, it is possible to some extent to conflate positions on environmental regulation 
with positions on federal regulation more generally. Republicans have, over the last 
century, increasingly associated themselves with a hands-off approach that limits 
federal government intervention120. In contrast, Democrats have increasingly 
aligned themselves with progressive policies that call for strong government 
presence121. As environmental regulations grow more complicated they inherently 
call for more government action and this need pairs more closely with Democratic 
ideas122.   
Democrats also tend to focus on the necessity of social justice and the 
equality of outcome more than Republicans123. They argue that representative 
government has an obligation to ensure not only equality of opportunity but also to 
some extent the equality of outcome for citizens124. Environmental regulation, 
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specifically disclosure, pairs well with this belief125. In contrast, Republicans argue 
that this level of equality represents untoward government interference126. 
Disclosed information is made available to everyone. Thus, it may be used by 
anyone to alleviate environmental harms or prevent future damage. Democrats tend 
to support the necessity of this publicly available information because they place a 
larger emphasis on issues of equality than do Republicans, thus they more 
frequently support disclosure127.  
Republicans tend to focus more on the importance of maintaining free 
markets128. They agree with Democrats regarding equality of opportunity, but 
beyond this point they place greater emphasis on the necessity for markets to 
operate without government influence rather than equality of outcome129. 
Democrats argue that free markets actually place unfair burdens on disadvantaged 
sectors of the population; in essence they are not “free” for a large portion of the 
population130. Republicans accept the premise that there will be some economic 
losers131. They place more value in deregulating markets to allow them to function 
completely privately132. This does not pair well with disclosure in many cases, which 
inherently calls for the government to regulate industry. Thus, Republicans can be 
expected to support disclosure less frequently than Democrats.  
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Under this assessment, observed voting patterns regarding disclosure in 
environmental legislation can be explained both because Democratic legislators are 
actively voting for environmental protections and also because Republican 
legislators are actively voting against them. Both parties’ actions can be explained 
through strict adherence to the stated preferences of their party over government 
intervention.  
Increasing partisanship has resulted in districts that are firmly Republican or 
Democratic, particularly on the national level133.  Unlike broad ideological patterns, 
it is difficult to adapt the trend toward firm regional stratification between 
Republicans and Democrats directly to state legislatures. On one hand, voting 
patterns do suggest that legislators frequently vote along party lines134. This is a 
clear indication that partisanship plays a role in state legislatures. There have also 
been decreasing instances of split party legislatures on the state level in recent 
years135. However, there is a seemingly large contradiction to this conclusion: state 
legislatures have frequently changed partisan hands in recent years136. There have 
been sweeping trends that favored either Democrats or Republicans and resulted 
one party or the other gaining control of state and local level jurisdictions around 
the country137. The wave of Democratic wins in 2008 ushered in a new era of control 
of the national executive branch and expanded control of both houses of the 
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national legislative branch138. Democrats also won seats at both the state and local 
level in 2008; there was a consensus of support for the party at all levels of 
government. This control lasted for two years, until Republicans enjoyed a similar 
wave of wins in 2010 that gave them control over part of the national legislative 
branch and strong support at lower levels of government139. These two trends 
indicate that control over state government can more easily change hands than 
control over the national government. 
The waves in 2008 and 2010 for Democrats and Republicans respectively are 
departures from the norm of the preceding years. There was a status quo of control 
that existed between the two major parties roughly from 1990-2007140.  This is 
notable not for which parties controlled specific aspects of government but rather 
for the fact that this control was relatively steadily fixed between the two parties141. 
On its face, the lack of turnover seems to fit with the notion of increasing 
partisanship142. Increasing partisanship results in more gerrymandered districts 
that are less likely to change hands143. However, the 2008 and 2010 waves of 
support, which manifested themselves through each party taking control of lower 
levels of government,  do not fit with the assumption that legislative districts should 
be increasingly fixed with more partisanship. A large wave of support for one party 
or the other is not uncommon and could be interpreted as a hallmark of increasing 
partisan divides. However, such large turnover between parties on the state and 
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local level is unexpected if one considers that increasing partisanship is expected to 
pair with more firmly entrenched partisan districts144.   
State legislatures do, however, change partisan hands more frequently than 
national legislatures145. This could be the result of different restrictions on the state 
bodies that impact turnover rates, both in terms of legislators and partisan control. 
Many states place term limits on their legislative branches. This results in less 
loyalty to particular legislators and opens the door for more turnovers in 
personnel146. Voters in state-level elections are not necessarily loyal to an individual 
legislator for many years, which opens the door to making more frequent switches 
in the party they vote for147. This is not meant to make any comment over voting 
patterns in state-level races, but rather to note that voters in these races see more 
turnovers among candidates due to term limits. Though the trends seen among state 
legislatures cannot be attributed solely to one cause, examination of term limits may 
help explain the more frequent shifts in partisan control of state legislatures. This 
trend differs between state and national governments, unlike the broader 
ideological conversation around increasing partisanship that is more similar 
between the two levels of government.  
These trends toward increasing partisanship in American politics are not 
specific to environmental issues but they have played a large role in the partisan 
support that environmental protection currently enjoys. Partisan trends have 
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influenced the entire political landscape by pushing Democrats and Republicans 
apart on all issues of governance. The largest impact on environmental issues has 
come from the opposing positions each party has taken on the question of scope 
regarding federal regulation. Environmental legislation increasingly calls for 
comprehensive oversight. Democrats are generally in favor of granting the 
government this authority while Republicans are not. Thus, Democrats have become 
associated with environmental protection by supporting large-scale government 
action at different levels of government while Republicans oppose these measures.  
IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PARTIES 
The Republican and Democratic Parties each have a set of beliefs that they 
embrace in their official party platforms that guide their views in all legislative 
decisions they make. The two parties address the same broad issues in the 
explanations of their respective philosophies but they often approach them from 
different angles. For example, when discussing environmental protections the 
Republican Party platform focuses on conservation and the necessity of balancing 
economic development and private property rights in the short run with 
conservation goals over the long run148. In contrast, the Democratic Party platform 
discusses environmental protection in the context of preserving natural areas for 
future generations and explicitly rejects the idea of creating a dichotomy between 
healthy economy and healthy environment149. These two platforms advance the 
parties’ respective positions on environmental protection by addressing points that 
can make positive statements about each Party’s position in different ways.  
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 Throughout American history there have been two parties but they have 
changed their ideological affiliation with the “left” and “right” or “conservatism” and 
“liberalism” over time150. In the modern political lexicon, the Democratic Party is 
aligned with the left, espousing progressive values through increased government 
action and robust social programs151.  The Democratic Party suggests that 
government at all levels should have authority to manage social programs in order 
to improve people’s lives and to oversee industry to ensure that there are no 
violations that may negatively impact private citizens152. The Republican Party is on 
the right in modern politics, focusing its efforts on reducing inefficiencies in 
government and protecting basic freedoms153. The Republican Party suggests that it 
is necessary to reduce the size of government at all levels; it suggests that many 
tasks currently under the government’s purview could be handled more efficiently 
and cost effectively by private entities154. There is expected variation among 
individual members of the Parties, to the far left and right and more toward the 
center, but these positions can be considered a median representation of 
Democratic and Republican ideologies.  
Neither Party’s platform directly mentions hydraulic fracturing, likely 
because this is a relatively new issue and rather contentious. National platforms are 
written in a relatively ambiguous manner to avoid contention and allow the Party 
room for interpretation when it decides on legislative actions155. However, from 
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reading the Parties’ stances on the environment and government authority as well 
as statements from leading members of both Parties it is possible to make some 
statements regarding their views on this issue. The Democratic Party broadly 
supports a cautious approach to the hydraulic fracturing process with necessary 
government and citizen oversight156. Democrats suggest a that thorough research of 
hydraulic fracturing methods and projected impacts from proposed operations must 
occur before beginning drilling157. The Republican Party takes a more favorable 
view of hydraulic fracturing; it suggests that this new method of natural gas 
recovery will provide jobs and American energy independence158. Republicans 
support hydraulic fracturing based upon existing knowledge, focusing on the 
economic benefits that arise as a result of the process159. The positions of each party 
should once again be considered a median for individual politicians’ views on 
hydraulic fracturing. Strong positive or negative impacts for politicians’ 
constituencies may serve to swing their opinion away from what could be expected 
based upon their party affiliation. That is to say a Republican from a district that will 
be negatively impacted by hydraulic fracturing may not support the process or a 
Democrat from a district that stands to benefit greatly  from hydraulic fracturing 
may in fact support it. Median preferences represent a hypothetical starting point 
for examining the Parties’ stances on hydraulic fracturing with necessary 
allowances to be made for deviation from the median due to specific legislators’ 
concerns.  
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METHODS 
Based upon previously discussed trends, it can be assumed that Democratic-
controlled states are more likely enact hydraulic fracturing legislation that includes 
disclosure mechanisms more frequently than are Republican-controlled states. This 
study will seek to examine whether this prediction will play out in various state 
governments throughout the United States. In order to quantify this prediction, this 
study examined enacted bills from different states pertaining to hydraulic 
fracturing. It compared them based upon a stringent/ non-stringent classification, 
which was defined through various criteria: whether they include any disclosure 
mechanisms and if so what kind, what state the bills were passed in, whether they 
were proposed by a Democrat or a Republican, the partisan composition of the 
passing state’s legislature, the total vote counts for each bill, which party controls 
the governor’s seat, whether the bills were passed upon its first introduction, 
whether the bills were introduced separately or with a package of bills, when they 
were introduced, and what factors external to the government may have impacted a 
bill’s reception.  
The bills selected were from both Democrat-controlled states and 
Republican-controlled states. All of the bills were from 2012 or 2013. This set time 
frame helped control for potential changes in the political climate regarding 
hydraulic fracturing. There has been substantial legislative action surrounding 
hydraulic fracturing since the early 2000s and it has increased each year. Hydraulic 
fracturing, especially new horizontal drilling methods, were relatively unknown but 
as the public and legislators learned more, legislation changed its focus to 
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incorporate updated knowledge. It is difficult to predict or control for changes over 
a long period of time. Thus, the study confined itself to a relatively small two-year 
period. Furthermore, it focused on the most recent legislation from the past two 
years because this was considered the most salient to future action on this topic. 
Consideration was given to past legislation if it impacts the legislation under 
consideration, i.e. if one of the bills being discussed is an update or direct response 
to prior legislation. Otherwise the study confined itself to legislation from 2012-
2013 pertaining to disclosure in hydraulic fracturing legislation. 
The study initially sought to control the time frame differently by limiting 
legislation to be considered between 2008-2012. However, it was considered 
imprudent to exclude legislation passed in 2013 because this time period 
encompasses many bills on the subject of hydraulic fracturing that are germane to 
the study. As long as legislation met other criteria, it was included for consideration 
if it was from 2013. Further, there was a relatively lower volume of bills passed in 
2008-2011 pertaining to hydraulic fracturing and even fewer that dealt with 
mandatory disclosure mechanisms. Thus, it was decided that it would be 
unnecessary for the study to expand its timeframe in include 2008-2011. The study 
did not speculate about future efficacy of the legislation due to the unpredictable 
and uncomfirmable nature of such predictions. The study conducted a close analysis 
of legislation pertaining to disclosure in hydraulic fracturing and it briefly discussed 
legislation pertaining to hydraulic fracturing generally.  
All of the bills examined were enacted pieces of legislation only. Enacted 
legislation has concrete voting data that can be examined to determine patterns and 
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analyze whether they fall along party lines, as could be expected. Bills that have 
been enacted into law were also preferred over proposed legislation because this 
eliminates any radical legislation that may have been introduced without the 
legislator in question intending to actually see it through the entire legislative 
process. Bills where the sponsor did not intend to see them through the legislative 
process were not included in this study because they cannot be guaranteed to 
accurately represent the dominant views of the introductory legislator’s party. For 
this same reason, the final enacted text of a bill was given priority in the analytical 
process, though radical changes from earlier versions were noted if they affected the 
final text of the bill.  
The decision was made to include bills from governments controlled by each 
major party in order to allow for a robust sample of hydraulic fracturing legislation 
that captures the dominant mood of each party. This allowed for a comparison of 
different iterations of Democrat and Republican-backed hydraulic fracturing 
legislation. While it was not possible to completely control for how extremely 
Democratic or Republican a state’s government is, the nature of each state 
government was documented. This level of liberalism or conservatism was 
considered in the final analysis of the bill- its classification as stringent or non-
stringent- if it was deemed to have an effect on the classification. 
In coding bills as either stringent or non-stringent, this study evaluated all of 
the above-mentioned factors for each case (proposing party, vote count, partisan 
composition of the state government, separate bill or package, date of introduction, 
action from extra-governmental sources during drafting). Classification considered 
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the state’s relationship with the FracFocus database and whether the bill changed 
this relationship. Non-stringent bills were those that do not mandate reporting 
information to FracFocus and leave this to the discretion of the industry actor. Semi-
stringent bills were those that encourage did not make any mention of disclosure 
that would go beyond the existing option of reporting to FracFocus but do not go 
any further, either with a separate state-specific system or the capacity to sue for 
violations found in the mandatorily disclosed information. Stringent bills were those 
that mandate reporting to FracFocus or create a separate state-specific system for 
mandatory information disclosure or allow either government actors or private 
entities to sue industry violators. This determination focused especially on the 
inclusion of rigorous disclosure mechanisms that are enforced by the state; these 
will lead to a stringent classification. The presence of these new opportunities for 
disclosure is linked to what can be done with the information that is made public. 
The existing FracFocus system does not  provide for any recourse regarding 
information that is in violation of state statues for waste water content or disposal 
methods, well location or depth, etc. New state-specific disclosure provisions rectify 
this and offer opportunity for action in response to violations as they arise. 
Thus, the stringent or non-stringent classification was considered a 
summation of the bill’s attitude toward the proliferation or cessation of hydraulic 
fracturing in the state. Bills that include new state-specific disclosure mechanisms 
that intend to regulate or limit hydraulic fracturing were considered stringent. Bills 
that did not include new methods for disclosure and instead relied only upon 
voluntary reporting to FracFocus  will be considered non-stringent. Bills that did not 
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make any mention of disclosure that would go beyond the existing option of 
reporting to FracFocus, through a separate state-specific system or by offering 
citizens the capacity to sue for violations Bills that encouraged reporting to 
FracFocus and included some type of provisions for disclosure short of a new public 
database to replace FracFocus were considered semi-stringent. Bills were be read 
by the author and one additional person and given independent ratings. The two 
were compared and a single consensus rating was applied. The second reader was 
also an undergraduate student familiar with hydraulic fracturing legislation and 
disclosure mechanisms, though not with the particular bills in this study. The 
second reader discussed with the author the meaning of stringent, semi-stringent, 
and non-stringent classifications before reading any of the cases. After comparing 
independent ratings, the author and second reader found their ratings agreed in all 
cases. Thus, the measures of stringency can be considered generally valid.  
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was introduced separately or as part of a larger package can have a profound impact 
upon the content of the bill and its trajectory through the legislature. Bills that are 
considered separately may face higher scrutiny and thus may contain less extreme 
measures, especially if they have a high profile and are subject to much editing and 
debate throughout their consideration by the legislature. Conversely, bills that are 
part of a group of bills may face less scrutiny and thus may include more extreme 
measures in either direction.  
For a similar reason, the composition of a state’s government was also 
considered. Based upon the observed patterns of partisanship within American 
politics, it can be predicted that governments that are heavily weighted toward one 
party will exhibit more extreme behavior than those that are more equally 
composed of legislators from both parties. One-party-dominated states display 
Republican or Democratic voting behavior more frequently but they also display 
more extremely Republican or Democratic voting behavior than their mixed-party 
equivalents. Due to the increasing divide between the two major American parties, 
each group has moved further to the left or right on the political spectrum. The 
growing divide and shrinking incentive for compromise dictate that when parties 
are unencumbered by legislators from the opposition they can move further to the 
extremes of the political spectrum.  
It is also important to consider whether external factors influenced the bill’s 
trajectory. If it is a high profile piece of legislation, a bill may receive either 
endorsement or condemnation from a variety of nongovernmental organizations. 
These groups vary in their capacity to influence policy but certain groups can have a 
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very strong effect. Environmental organizations may lobby for more protection or 
they may rally against a particularly non-stringent bill. Conversely, industry 
representatives may use their influence to ensure that bills do not unduly affect 
established business practices and in doing so may lobby against new 
environmental protections. These different extra-governmental groups’ power lies 
in making their opinion publicly known and trying to influence legislators to 
respond to these pressures.  
External factors are expected to vary between cases. Each state has a 
different set of extra-governmental organizations that affect the trajectory of bills 
within their borders. The impact of these varying groups will be assessed based 
upon demonstrable action that they take. If they visibly support or speak against the 
bill, their opinion will be considered in the assessment of its stringency. These 
public responses may come from environmental interest groups, non-partisan 
governmental entities, etc. States may also have unique geographic conditions, such 
as particularly large deposits of natural gas or natural disasters that shape public 
opinion of hydraulic fracturing. Furthermore, some bills make provisions other than 
disclosure regarding hydraulic fracturing, which may impact the entire bill’s 
reception.  
All bills selected came from the National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) 
database. Enacted legislation from 2012 was sorted by the same categories decided 
upon by NCSL: levels of governance and hydraulic fracturing, taxes, disclosure, and 
other. The list of enacted legislation from 2013 was also taken from the NCSL 
database. The bills were not categorized by NCSL in this case, so the author sorted 
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them into the following categories: tax implementation, mandatory study, 
permitting, classification, disclosure, and other. The categories for 2013 legislation 
were based upon the content of the bills from that year, not simply matched to the 
2012 categories.  
ANALYSIS OF CASES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Operational Hydraulic Fracturing 
Wells 
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HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LEGISLATION IN 2012 
In 2012, fourteen states enacted fourteen pieces of legislation related to 
hydraulic fracturing. The bills spanned a range of topics related to hydraulic 
fracturing: five states addressed levels of government, seven states addressed 
hydraulic fracturing in some other manner, and three states addressed fracking fluid 
disclosure.  
Bill Level of government Other 
ID HB 464 local restrictions 
related to oil and gas 
production 
 
KS HB 2526 Kansas Corporation 
Commission can 
regulate hydraulic 
fracturing 
 
ND HCR 3053 limit the EPA’s ability 
to regulate hydraulic 
fracturing 
 
SD HCR 10005 sole responsibility for 
the regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing 
to the states 
 
UT SCR 12 sole responsibility for 
the regulation of 
hydraulic fracturing 
to the states 
 
ID HB 379  tax on all oil and gas produced, 
sold, or transported 
MD HB 1123 
 
 presumptive impact area around 
hydraulic fracturing wells 
NC SB 820  updated regulatory program to 
manage horizontal drilling  
OH SB 315  provisions for horizontal 
hydraulic fracturing well 
production 
OK SB 885  gross production taxes 
associated with natural gas 
extraction 
TN HR 98  regulations to provide oversight 
for fracking 
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In 2012, there were also three pieces of legislation that dealt specifically with 
information disclosure related to hydraulic fracturing operations. Indiana HB 1107 
required the Natural Resources Commission to adopt rules address the reporting 
and disclosure of hydraulic fracturing treatments. Louisiana HB 957 mandated the 
disclosure of fracking fluid composition within 20 days after a hydraulic fracturing 
well is first created. Finally, Pennsylvania HB 1950 addressed a number of topics 
within disclosure including impact fees, well setbacks, local ordinances, and well 
location restrictions, which all dealt with information disclosure. Further analysis 
will determine the relative strength of each bill as well as the intent with regard to 
environmental protection.  
Bill Legislature Classification  External Factors 
IN HB 1107 Republican Semi 
Criticism from environmental 
groups 
LA HB 957 Republican Stringent Natural disaster 
PA HB 1950 Republican Semi 
National-level attention, 
criticism from environmental 
groups 
 
INDIANA HOUSE BILL 1107 
Indiana HB 1107 was first introduced in the Indiana State House of 
Representatives on January 9, 2012 by Representative Eric Allan Koch (R- Bedford). 
The House passed it upon a third reading Yea: 95, Nay: 0, Not Voting: 2, Absent: 3, 
on January 31, 2012. The bill was then referred to the Indiana State Senate, where it 
was introduced by Senator Beverly Gard (R- Greenfield) and passed on a third 
reading Yea: 50, Nay: 0, No Vote: 0, Absent: 0, on February 21, 2012. The governor 
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then signed the bill into law on February 29, 2012. It was scheduled to take effect 
starting on July 1, 2012. Republicans controlled the State House, State Senate, and 
Governor’s seat at the time that HB 1107 was introduced and passed. HB 1107 was 
introduced as a single piece of legislation, not as a part of a larger package of bills.  
Indiana HB 1107 includes several provisions for information disclosure. The 
bill requires industry to share the volume and source of base fluid used, a 
description of each additive product used in a hydraulic fracturing treatment, the 
volume of each additive product used in a hydraulic fracturing treatment expressed 
as a maximum percentage of the total fracturing fluid volume, the maximum surface 
treating pressure and injection treating pressure, and any other information the 
Natural Resources Commission considers necessary. All of these disclosure 
requirements are aimed at the technical side of hydraulic fracturing. They deal with 
scientific parameters that are endemic to the hydraulic fracturing process. The bill 
does not deal with any disclosure requirements that can clearly be interpreted as an 
attempt by the government to limit the harms caused to existing communities by the 
placement of hydraulic fracturing operations. For example, some states have passed 
caps on the number of wells that can be built near existing towns or the minimum 
distance between a well and residences or businesses. Indiana HB 1107 does not 
deal with this type of mandatory disclosure. It also does not make provisions for 
what should be done with the information once the state government has collected 
it. There is no mention of either the government making the information public or 
whether the information will be available upon request to the public.  
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Both the disclosure of technical information and disclosure aimed at 
addressing community impacts caused by hydraulic fracturing indicate some level 
of stringency. However, disclosure of community impact should be considered more 
stringent than disclosure of technical information. Disclosure of technical facts 
merely makes the information available to the government. On its own, this type of 
disclosure does not make information publicly available. It may be paired with a 
provision to make information public, either through a state-managed database, 
upon request by private citizens, or by another method. Technical information 
disclosure is not always paired with such provisions. This type of disclosure consists 
of industry actors sharing information about their practices with the government. In 
contrast, disclosure of information about community is centered on factors that 
directly affect a site of proposed or existing hydraulic fracturing. The information 
disclosed in this case may be the allowable distance between drilling wells and 
residences, or the duration of drilling operations at one site, or any other factor that 
directly impacts people living near hydraulic fracturing operations. Unlike more 
technical information, disclosure provisions specifically aimed at addressing 
community impact of hydraulic fracturing have an inherent link to the public 
welfare. Thus, this information is more stringent because the content that is being 
disclosed has a direct impact upon citizens’ wellbeing. Even if disclosure of 
community impacts is not explicitly paired with another provision that makes the 
information public, disclosing this information indicates a level of consideration of 
human impact by industry that is higher than merely disclosing technical facts.  
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Indiana HB 1107 can be considered to be semi-stringent legislation in 
regulating hydraulic fracturing. It includes measures that mandate information 
disclosure by the hydraulic fracturing industry and thus does attempt to regulate 
the industry. Furthermore, there is a provision stating that the Indiana Natural 
Resources Commission may collect other information it deems necessary. This 
clause can be interpreted differently based upon the leadership of the Commission. 
The possibility exists that the Commission could use this to ask for more technical 
information than what is listed or it could go further and ask for information 
regarding community impacts. The bill does not, however, create a separate publicly 
available database for the disclosed information. The bill also makes no mention of 
whether information collected about industry practices will be made publicly 
available, either by the government or upon request by individuals.  
LOUISIANA HOUSE BILL 957 
Louisiana HB 957 was first introduced in the Louisiana State House of 
Representatives on March 2, 2012 by Representative John Bel Edwards (D-Amite). 
The House passed it upon a third reading Yea: 94, Nay: 3, Other: 9 on April 23, 2012. 
The bill was then referred to the Louisiana State Senate, where it was introduced on 
April 24, 2012 and passed again on a third reading Yea: 39, Nay: 0, on May 16, 2012. 
The governor then signed the bill into law on June 13, 2012 and it became Louisiana 
Act No 812. It was scheduled to take effect starting on August 1, 2012. Republicans 
controlled the State House, State Senate, and Governor’s seat at the time that HB 957 
was introduced and passed. The President of the Louisiana State Senate at the time 
was a Republican but had previously identified as a member of the Democratic 
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Party. HB 957 was introduced as a single piece of legislation, not as a part of a larger 
package of bills.  
Louisiana HB 957 includes several provisions for information disclosure. The 
bill gives the Commissioner of Conservation the power to make any reasonable 
regulations that monitor the operator of a well “That utilizes the application of fluids 
with force or pressure in order to create artificial fractures in the formation for the 
purpose of improving the capacity to produce hydrocarbons,”- a hydraulic 
fracturing well. The bill further mandates that well operators report the type and 
volume of the hydraulic fracturing fluid, a list of additives used- including the 
specific trade name and the supplier of the additive, and a list of ingredients 
contained in the hydraulic fracturing fluid no later than twenty days following the 
completion of hydraulic fracturing operations and in a manner determined by the 
Commissioner.  HB 957 does not hold the operator of the well responsible for 
reporting information that is not provided by the builder of the well due to a claim 
of trade secret information.   
Similarly to Indiana HB 1107, these disclosure requirements are aimed at the 
technical side of hydraulic fracturing. They deal with scientific parameters that are 
endemic to the hydraulic fracturing process rather than explicit disclosure 
requirements intended to limit the proliferation of the hydraulic fracturing industry. 
They do, however, go further than the Indiana bill in monitoring and limiting the 
chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing operations. There is also an allowance made 
for the information to be disclosed to the public, “In a manner determined by the 
Commissioner.” That provision also provides an enormous amount of leeway for the 
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Commissioner of Conservation to regulate the hydraulic fracturing industry as he 
sees fit. The inclusion of this open-ended clause allows for the current 
Commissioner to take an influential role in how the hydraulic fracturing industry is 
regulated and even whether it is able to thrive in the state of Louisiana. That is not 
to say the bill states the Commissioner’s goal, but the possibility exists  for the 
Commissioner to play a proactive part in regulating Louisiana’s hydraulic fracturing 
industry. However, an open provision is also a relatively common inclusion in 
legislation. It may be the case that the Commissioner does not go any further in the 
information he requires from industry. However, the possibility of further action 
does increase the probability of closer monitoring of industry than a bill that does 
not have such an open provision.   
Louisiana HB 957 can be considered stringent legislation in regulating 
hydraulic fracturing. It provides for measures that regulate the hydraulic fracturing 
industry. The bill also makes provisions for the information that it requires industry 
actors to disclose to then be made available to the public in a manner determined by 
the Commissioner, creating a database of sorts. The bill asks for information from 
the hydraulic fracturing industry and then makes it publicly available, which lends 
itself to the classification of HB 957 as stringent.  
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE BILL 1950 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 was first introduced in the Pennsylvania State House 
of Representatives on November 2, 2011 by Representative Brian Ellis (R- Butler). 
The House passed it upon a first reading Yea: 107, Nay: 76. The bill was then 
introduced in the State Senate, where it was passed with amendments Yea: 28, Nay: 
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22 on December 14, 2011. The amended bill was referred back to the State House, 
where the new version failed Yea: 0, Nay: 197 on December 20, 2011. The State 
Senate then considered the bill again. It was further amended and the State Senate 
passed a second version of the bill Yea: 31, Nay: 19 on February 7, 2012. The next 
day- February 8, 2012- the State House passed the newest version of the bill Yea: 
101, Nay: 90. The Governor then signed the bill into law on February 14, 2012. The 
bill was written to take immediate effect. Republicans controlled the State House, 
State Senate, and Governor’s seat at the time that HB 1950 was introduced and 
passed. HB 1950 was introduced as an extremely high profile single piece of 
legislation. It was not a part of a larger package of bills. 
There were significant differences between the original versions of the bill 
that the State House and State Senate passed. The main differences between the two 
versions of the bill lay in their treatment of impact fees. The two proposals differed 
on whether the impact fees should be an optional tax at the county level or a single 
statewide tax, the amount of the impact fees, and the degree and structure of state 
preemption of local regulation. These differences were eventually reconciled but 
they resulted in numerous votes by both bodies.  
Pennsylvania HB 1950 includes many mechanisms for information 
disclosure. The bill consolidates the Oil and Gas Act with modifications and 
additions relating to definitions, well permits, permit objections, comments by 
municipalities and storage operators, well location restrictions, well site restoration, 
protection of water supplies, notification to public drinking water systems, 
containment for unconventional wells, transportation records regarding 
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wastewater fluids, hydraulic fracturing chemical discharge requirements, public 
nuisances, enforcement orders, inspection and production of materials, witnesses, 
depositions and rights of entry, third party liability and inspection reports.  
This bill is similar to both Indiana HB 1107 and Louisiana HB 957 with 
respect to its provisions regarding technical regulations of hydraulic fracturing. 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 examines many technical aspects of a hydraulic fracturing 
operation, from the initial drilling of the well and the materials used in its 
construction to the emissions inherent to the operation of a hydraulic fracturing 
well to the emergency response that may be necessary. Pennsylvania HB 1950 also 
includes some nondisclosure elements that impact hydraulic fracturing operations 
in the state. In discusses both criminal and civil penalties for violations of the bill’s 
provisions, the placement of wells with regard to existing communities, and the 
necessary steps for well site restoration after a hydraulic fracturing outfit completes 
operations. These various provisions stem from the initial information disclosure 
mandates that the bill contains. The punitive measures taken for violations of the 
bill must be backed up with evidence of wrongdoing. This evidence can only be 
gathered by using information that is disclosed by industry due to provisions 
contained within HB 1950. Similarly, steps for restoration are based upon a 
response to what impact hydraulic fracturing operations had. This impact can be 
assessed through information that is gathered under provisions for information 
disclosure in HB 1950.  
Pennsylvania HB 1950 can be considered to be semi-stringent legislation in 
regulating hydraulic fracturing. It includes measures that regulate the hydraulic 
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fracturing industry by gathering information about its actions and places the 
industry under the scrutiny of the Pennsylvania State General Assembly. However, it 
allows for “trade secret” exceptions to disclosure requirements for the contents of 
fracking fluid, which leaves large potential for noncompliance with disclosure 
mandates. There is also criticism that the expansive written disclosure 
requirements are not strict enough to compel meaningful informational reporting 
that will allow both government and private industry to adequately understand and 
monitor the Pennsylvania hydraulic fracturing industry. It has also been criticized 
because it takes autonomy away from local governments in favor of determinations 
made by the state government. There are many things written into the bill but it is 
less clear how compliance can be ensured or what will be done with the information 
once it is collected. The bill does not move beyond the FracFocus database for 
reporting information, nor does it mention any provisions for making information 
available to the public.  
 HYDRAULIC FRACTURING LEGISLATION IN 2013 
2013 presents a much more robust sample of legislation pertaining to 
hydraulic fracturing. There were thirty-seven total bills enacted in twenty-two 
different states that pertained to hydraulic fracturing in some capacity. The bills 
spanned a range of topics within the realm of hydraulic fracturing: seventeen bills 
dealt with taxation of the materials or revenues associated with hydraulic 
fracturing, two bills mandated further impact studies of potential sites for hydraulic 
fracturing operations, four bills addressed updated or new permitting schemes for 
hydraulic fracturing, six bills made rules related to classification requirements for 
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the hydraulic fracturing industry, four bills dealt with other miscellaneous topics 
related to hydraulic fracturing, and four bills dealt with disclosure requirements for 
hydraulic fracturing operations. 
Bill Taxes 
AK SB 21 Amends tax to 35% of oil or gas value 
 
Severance tax trust fund 
MS HB 
1698 
Reduces the natural gas and oil severance tax rate  
MT HB 36 
Distributes funds from the county school oil and natural gas impact 
fund. 
MT SB 175 
Redirects oil and natural gas production tax revenue from the state 
general fund 
ND HB 
1278 
Amends oil and gas gross production tax allocation. 
ND HB 
1358 
Amends oil and gas gross production tax allocation.  
ND SB 
2014 
Establishes oil and gas research fund 
OH HB 72 Modernizes how the county recorder's office maintains records  
OK SB 166 Tax on certain income from oil and gas property 
OK HB 
2310 
Relates to sales tax exemptions 
OK SB 977 Consolidates to multiple versions of statutes relating to fracturing  
VA HB 
1233 
Relates to local license tax ordinances for the severance of oil, coal or 
gas 
VA HB 
1771 
Establishes fair market value for purposes of local gas severance 
taxes 
VA SB 658 
Relates to local license tax ordinances for the severance of minerals, 
oil and gas 
VA SB 
1111 
Establishes fair market value for local gas severance taxes 
WV SB 638 Terminates a severance tax exemption for natural gas or oil  
Bill Mandate Study 
AZ SCR 4 
Interim study to research potential changes for natural gas royalty 
payments 
CA SB 4 
Requires an independent scientific study on hydraulic fracturing 
treatments  
Bill Permitting 
AL HB 503 
Authorizes the Oil and Gas Board to set fees for the recovery of oil 
from oil sands. 
CO HB 1057 
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FL HB 
1083 
Declares underground natural gas storage to be in the public interest 
NC SB 76 Authorizes DNR to issue permits for oil and gas exploration  
UT SB 277  
Expedite the processing, granting, and streamlining of mineral and 
energy leases 
Bill Classification  
ID HB 49 Defines Class II Injection Well as a deep injection well 
MN HB 
976 
Provides for silica sand mining model standards and technical 
assistance 
ND HB 
1198 
Defines “stripper well.”  
ND HB 
1134 
Amend gas flaring restrictions 
OK SB 767 Relates to oil and gas production; updates statutory reference 
PN SB 259 Amends the act of July 20, 1979 (P.L.183, No.60), adding definitions 
Bill Miscellaneous  
NV SB 390 Develop a hydraulic fracturing program for the State of Nevada 
TX HB 
2767 
Recycling for beneficial use certain liquid or semiliquid waste from 
drilling 
TX SB 514 
Installation, maintenance, operation, and relocation of saltwater 
pipeline facilities 
VA HB 710 Relates to ownership rights of natural gas or coal bed methane 
 
In 2013, there were also four pieces of legislation that dealt specifically with 
fracking fluid disclosure. Arkansas HB 2001 required an operator intending to 
conduct shale operations to provide a single enhanced written notice to be given to 
the surface owner that describes the proposed shale operations and the location of 
the proposed well and the pad location with a statement that the operator has a 
pending or approved drilling permit for the proposed shale operations on the 
surface owner's property. Illinois SB 1715 created the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Regulatory Act, which prohibited high volume horizontal hydraulic fracturing 
operations performed without a permit; provided requirements for permits, 
insurance, well construction and drilling, disclosures, water quality monitoring, and 
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related matters; created the Mines and Minerals Regulatory Fund; provided for 
recommendations relating to the location of gas or oil and process materials 
resources; and imposed a tax on the severance of oil or gas produced through 
hydraulic fracturing. Illinois SB 2155 added to the aforementioned Hydraulic 
Fracturing Regulatory Act by mandating that the Department of Natural Resources 
must forward necessary information to each Chief County Assessment Officer for 
the administration and application of ad valorem real property taxes at the county 
level; and amended the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law in the Property Tax 
Code, provided that new property includes any increase in assessed value due to oil 
or gas production that was not produced in or accounted for during the previous 
levy year. Finally, Rhode Island SB 725 gave the Commissioner of Energy Resources 
the authority to collect price, inventory and product delivery dates- including 
amounts and types of product sold; material regarding petroleum products, natural 
gas and other fuels available for supply within the state; and any other information 
that is necessary, provided that the information collected will not be public 
information unless prepared for that purpose and may be shared with energy offices 
of other states provided they have suitable safeguards against public dissemination. 
Further analysis will determine the relative strength of each bill as well as the intent 
with regard to environmental protection.  
 
 
Bill Legislature Classification  External Factors 
Arkansas HB 2001 Mixed Semi Mixed legislature, little 
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ARKANSAS HOUSE BILL 2001 
 Arkansas HB 2001 was first introduced to the Arkansas State House of 
Representatives by Representative Greg Leding (D-Fayetteville) on March 11, 2013. 
The House passed it upon a third reading Yea: 78, Nay: 1, Other: 21. The bill was 
then introduced in the Arkansas State Senate, where it was passed Yea: 34, Nay: 1, 
Other: 0 with one amendment. This version was remanded back to the House, where 
it passed Yea: 89, Nay: 0, Other: 11. The Governor then signed the bill into law on 
April 16, 2013. The bill was written to take immediate effect. Democrats controlled 
the governor’s seat while Republicans controlled the State House and State Senate. 
Control of the State House and State Senate switched control from Democrats to 
Republicans in 2012. Both bodies are currently held by narrow margins. Arkansas 
HB 2001 did not receive significant media attention. It was introduced as a single 
bill, not part of a larger package.  
This bill includes various mechanisms for information disclosure. The rules 
of the commission require an enhanced written notice to be given to the surface 
property owner at least fourteen days by the operator before he proposes to begin 
shale operations on the surface owner’s property. This notice must contain a 
statement that the operator has a pending or approved drilling permit for the 
media attention 
Illinois SB 1715 Democratic Stringent 
Criticism from interest 
groups; multi-year drafting 
process 
Illinois SB 2155 Democratic N/A Part of above bill 
Rhode Island SB 725 Democratic Semi 
Little media attention, 
deals with disclosure more 
broadly than just fracking 
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proposed shale operations on the surface owner's property and that the permit shall 
be available for inspection by the surface owner on request by the surface owner. 
Furthermore, it must contain the name, address, telephone number, fax number, and 
electronic mailing address of the operator or the operator's agent and be sent by 
certified United States mail or delivered personally to the surface owner at the 
address of the surface owner stated in the public records of the county collector of 
the county in which the surface owner’s property is located. This notice must 
describe the proposed shale operations and the location of the proposed well and 
the pad location, including the section, township, range, and plat of the pad location, 
if available. Apart from this requirement to give notice of an operator’s plans, 
Arkansas HB 2001 does not compel any further action from hydraulic fracturing 
well operators.  
This bill is different from the legislation passed in 2012 regarding disclosure 
in hydraulic fracturing operations. It does not address the technical aspects of 
hydraulic fracturing closely; there is no mention of fracking fluid, well depth or 
location, etc. Instead this bill focuses on compelling the well operator to give notice 
of his actions to surface property owners. There is no mention of further action on 
the part of the well operator nor is there much opportunity for protest from land 
owners. However, if notice is being given to landowners then the well operator has 
received previous approval from the state government. The bill does not address 
many of the environmental and community impacts that are inherent to hydraulic 
fracturing.  
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Arkansas HB 2001 can be considered a semi-stringent piece of legislation. It 
does address information disclosure surrounding hydraulic fracturing operations 
but it also leaves many issues untouched. The legislation mandates that well 
operators communicate with property owners who will be affected by their actions. 
However, it does not require the operator to give any other notice to begin, conduct, 
or complete shale operations on the surface owner’s property. The operator must 
receive approval from the state, but after this he is free to continue without an 
explicit process for gaining approval from landowners.  In this way, it is similar to 
the 2012 legislation that collects information but does not make further mention of 
publicizing the information collected (Indiana HB 1107 and Pennsylvania HB 1950). 
Arkansas HB 2001 “collects” information about proposed drilling operations and the 
state does go through a permitting process but it does not make the information 
public, nor are there provisions for citizens to gain access to the information. 
After written notice of the operator's intent to begin shale operations is given 
the bill does not compel further action. The bill also does not create an official 
opportunity for dialogue between operators and landowners. Thus, the bill makes 
an attempt to regulate hydraulic fracturing but the lack of opportunities for 
landowners to do anything with the information they receive decreases this bill’s 
stringency in regulating or limiting hydraulic fracturing. HB 2001 should be 
considered semi-stringent.  
 
ILLINOIS SENATE BILLS 1715 and 2155 
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Illinois SB 1715 was first introduced in the Illinois State Senate on February 
15, 2013 by Senator Michael Frerichs (D- Champaign). The Senate passed it upon a 
third reading Yea: 51, Nay: 0, Other: 8. The bill was then introduced in the State 
House of Representatives, where it was passed upon a third reading Yea: 108, Nay: 
9, Other: 1 on May 30, 2013. The amended bill was referred back to the State Senate, 
where the new version passed Yea: 52, Nay: 3, Other: 4 on May 30, 2013. The 
Governor then signed the bill into law on June 17, 2013. The bill was written to take 
immediate effect. Democrats controlled the State House, State Senate, and 
Governor’s seat at the time that SB 1715 was introduced and passed. SB 1715 
received significant media attention during its introduction. It was not a part of a 
larger package of bills, though a second bill was introduced in tandem and can be 
considered an addendum to SB 1715.  
Illinois SB 2155 was also first introduced in the Illinois State Senate on 
February 15, 2013 by Senator Michael Frerichs (D- Champaign). The Senate passed 
it upon a third reading Yea: 52, Nay: 0, Other: 7. The bill was then introduced in the 
State House of Representatives, where it was passed upon a third reading Yea: 104, 
Nay: 13, Other: 1 on May 31, 2013. The amended bill was referred back to the State 
Senate, where the new version passed Yea: 59, Nay: 0, Other: 0 on May 31, 2013. The 
Governor then signed the bill into law on Jun 17, 2013. The bill was written to take 
immediate effect. Democrats controlled the State House, State Senate, and 
Governor’s seat at the time that SB 2155 was introduced and passed.  
Illinois SB 1715 includes many mechanisms for information disclosure. The 
bill is comprehensive and addresses various aspects of the hydraulic fracturing 
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process. It has provisions for comprehensive disclosure requirements both before 
and after fracking occurs, including the creation of master lists of the base fluids, 
additives and chemicals that may be used in fracking, which are to be posted on the 
Illinois Department of Natural Resource’s (DNR) website. SB 1715 allows companies 
to request trade secret protection of any of the chemical information otherwise 
required to be disclosed. To pair with this, it also includes provisions to monitor 
which trade secrets are protected, that the public can challenge trade secret 
designations, and that health needs trump companies’ right to protect chemical 
information.  
The bill also requires fracking permit applicants to submit a water 
management plan describing the source of water to be used for fracking, the 
location where that water will be withdrawn, the anticipated volume and rate of 
each water withdrawal and the months when withdrawals will take place. After 
hydraulic fracturing has been completed, companies must report to the Illinois DNR 
the total water used in fracking and the locations from which the water was 
withdrawn. Notice of the permit application is published twice in a local newspaper 
and sent directly to owners of property near the proposed well site. Each permit 
application will be made available for public comment for 30 days. The bill makes 
provisions for anyone who may be adversely affected by the permit to request a 
public hearing. SB 1715 also provides that, in addition to the Attorney General and 
the State’s Attorney of the county in which fracking is taking place, any adversely 
affected persons – including environmental groups – may sue fracking companies 
for violations of the law or the Department for failure to perform its duties under 
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the Act. Illinois SB 1715 differs from many other states that enacted disclosure 
legislation in its scope. The bill goes further than many in comprehensively 
addressing many aspects of the hydraulic fracturing process. It increases necessary 
disclosure at almost every step of the hydraulic fracturing process, from identifying 
potential drilling sites to the mandatory cleanup process after a well is finished.  
In addition to disclosure-oriented provisions, SB 1715 also discussed many 
angles related to hydraulic fracturing operations. The bill prohibits open-air ponds 
for wastewater storage. It includes waste fluid management requirements and 
comprehensive water monitoring requirements. The bill also places the onus on 
fracking companies to prove that contamination of water sources near the well site 
was not caused by fracking. This does not take the form of public disclosure per say, 
but rather it assumes that hydraulic fracturing companies must prove to the DNR 
that they are not responsible for any environmental harms as a result of their work. 
It also includes setbacks from water sources and well construction standards. SB 
1715 also discusses water management and wildlife protection; it mandates that 
applicants must describe methods they will used to minimize water withdrawals 
and adverse impact to aquatic life from those withdrawals. The bill’s air quality 
requirements apply to both oil and gas wells and they apply during both the initial 
fracking process- well completions- and later in the production phase, whereas the 
federal rule only covers the initial fracking process. These standards exceed federal 
air quality requirements for oil and gas wells on both counts. SB 1715 also states 
that if a noticeable earthquake occurs which can be traced to the deep underground 
wells where fracking waste is injected, the DNR must adopt rules to monitor seismic 
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impacts and limit injection activity. This could become publicly disclosed 
information in the future, depending on how this rule is interpreted and enforced.  
SB 1715 grants the DNR broad authority to administer and enforce the 
legislation, including authority to inspect fracking sites, collect data, require testing 
or sampling, examine records and logs, hold hearings, adopt rules, and take other 
actions as may be necessary to enforce the it. This is a systematic theme throughout 
the various provisions explicitly included in the legislation: the DNR is responsible 
for their implementation and upkeep and it has relatively free reign to carry out the 
intent of the legislation.  
This bill is similar to the legislation passed in 2012 with regard to its 
regulation of the technical aspects of hydraulic fracturing. Illinois SB 1715 addresses 
almost every technical aspect of a hydraulic fracturing operation, from the initial 
drilling of the well and the materials used in its construction to the emissions 
inherent to the operation of a hydraulic fracturing well to the emergency response 
that may be necessary. However, there are also significant differences between the 
Illinois bills and those passed in 2012. HB 1715 goes further and addresses many of 
the environmental hazards that surround hydraulic fracturing, including water 
withdrawal and impact upon local wildlife. It also is one of the first bills to create a 
public comment process and a definitive measures for people to protest the location 
of potential hydraulic fracturing sites. Illinois SB 1715 also contains provisions to 
make information available to private citizens after it is collect4d by the 
government.   
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SB 2155 is unique among the legislation discussed because it is not a bill that 
can stand alone in regulating hydraulic fracturing. Rather, it was written with the 
express intent of adding on the regulation of the bill that made its way through the 
Illinois State Senate at the same time, SB 1715. It was intended to take effect only if 
the larger Hydraulic Fracturing Regulation Act passed in Illinois, and indeed 
language to this effect appears in the first sentence of the bill. It amends certain 
parts of the other bill, even as both were being debated upon the Senate and House 
floor.  
SB 2155 does contain provisions related to disclosure within hydraulic 
fracturing operations. The bill amended the Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act by 
providing that the Illinois Department of Natural Resources shall forward the 
necessary information to each Chief County Assessment Officer for the 
administration and application of ad valorem real property taxes at the county level. 
It also amended the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law in the Property Tax 
Code by providing that "new property" includes any increase in assessed value due 
to oil or gas production that was not produced in or accounted for during the 
previous levy year. SB 2155 addresses issues of disclosure related to county 
governments- it gives local government a larger regulatory role in overseeing 
potential hydraulic fracturing operations within its jurisdiction.  
Illinois SB 1715 can be considered a stringent piece of legislation in its 
regulation of hydraulic fracturing. It provides for expansive measures that oversee 
the hydraulic fracturing industry and places the industry under the scrutiny of the 
Illinois State General Assembly and DNR. Furthermore, the bill provides for 
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measures to disclose information collected by the government to the public and it 
allows citizens to take action to prevent hydraulic fracturing operations near them. 
Citizens also have recourse under the law if companies violate its provisions or the 
State fails to properly enforce it. With this piece of legislation, the Illinois State 
government has created significant barriers to entry for hydraulic fracturing 
operations that will serve to scrutinize any potential new actors thoroughly. The bill 
also creates a separate database administered by the Illinois state government that 
will handle information that is disclosed under provisions of this law. This database 
will be easily accessible to the public. Many of the other provisions that give private 
citizens the authority to act against hydraulic fracturing operations rely on 
information from this source.   
SB 2155 cannot be categorized as a separate piece of legislation. However, it 
is still appropriate to discuss the provisions it included pertaining to disclosure in 
hydraulic fracturing. It deals with less technical aspects of disclosure and it focuses 
more on human costs associated with hydraulic fracturing operations. It allows for 
local governments, who are often the experts on their given jurisdictions, to take a 
larger role in assessing the location of these operations. It is difficult, however, to 
consider whether SB 2155 is a stringent piece of legislation on its own. This bill was 
never intended to stand alone- rather it is an addition to the aforementioned SB 
1715. The larger Illinois SB 1715 (the Hydraulic Fracturing Regulatory Act) is 
certainly stringent, but it is difficult to consider one of its parts on its own merit.  
RHODE ISLAND SENATE BILL 725 
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Rhode Island SB 725 was first introduced on March 13, 2013 by State 
Senator V. Susan Sosnowksi. The Senate passed it upon a second reading Yea: 71, 
Nay: 1, Other: 3. The bill was then introduced in the State House of Representatives, 
where it was passed by a vote of concurrence on June 27, 2013. The Governor then 
signed the bill into law on July 15, 2013. The bill was written to take immediate 
effect. Democrats controlled the State House, State Senate, and Governor’s seat at 
the time that SB 725 was introduced and passed. The Democratic governor was 
originally elected as an independent but he switched his affiliation. SB 725 was not a 
part of a larger package of bills. 
 Rhode Island SB 725 included several different disclosure provisions.  The 
bill gave the Commissioner of Energy Resources the authority to collect price, 
inventory and product delivery dates- including amounts and types of product sold; 
material regarding petroleum products, natural gas and other fuels available for 
supply within the state; and any other information that is necessary. The bill 
specifies that the information collected will not be public unless explicitly prepared 
for that purpose. It does specify that the information may be shared with energy 
offices of other states provided they have suitable safeguards against public 
dissemination.  
This bill is different from most of the legislation previously discussed 
because it deals only with the collection and dissemination of information. It makes 
no comment upon the technical aspects of hydraulic fracturing, such as well location 
and depth or fracking fluid composition. The bill also does not make any comment 
upon disclosure regarding community impact, such as mandatory public notices and 
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commentary or legal recourse against hydraulic fracturing industry actors. Private 
citizens could theoretically use the information that is collected under the 
provisions of the bill to accomplish these goals. However, SB 725 does not have 
explicit provisions in place to make the information it collects public and there is 
some ambiguity in how much access private citizens would be granted upon 
requesting information.  
Rhode Island SB 725 can be considered semi-stringent legislation. It does 
make provisions for the disclosure of information regarding hydraulic fracturing. 
However, there is no mention made of what will be done with the information 
beyond keeping a government record. This information will be made publicly 
available to some extent but it remains to be seen whether it will be more accessible 
that the FracFocus database. The bill does make some mention of information that 
can be made public if it is specifically prepared for that purpose but it is difficult to 
say what this purpose may be or how often this may apply. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that the state would be somewhat reluctant to share information publicly 
because the bill makes explicit mention of the fact that information will only be 
shared with other state governments if they take suitable safeguards against public 
dissemination. The lack of explicit conversation regarding publicizing the 
information indicates that the bill is semi-stringent.  
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PARTISAN PREFERENCES 
This study anticipated that Democrats would be more likely to support 
environmental protections than Republicans. It went on to define disclosure as a 
policy tool that led to more protection with regard to hydraulic fracturing. This 
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definition was accepted with the caveat that disclosure only leads to increased 
environmental protections when it is paired with other provisions that make the 
information public or otherwise empower private citizens to act in response to 
disclosed information. In the context of this study, Democratic governments were 
assumed to have a preference for stringent legislation, Republican governments for 
non-stringent legislation, and split-party governments for semi-stringent legislation 
with regard to hydraulic fracturing.  
The study found that both Republican and Democratic governments 
departed from expected preferences more frequently than they adhered to them. 
There was only one case of a mixed-party government and it did adhere to its 
expected preference. However, no conclusions should be drawn regarding 
preferences of mixed-party governments more broadly because the sample size is 
only one. These departures from expected preferences by Republicans and 
Democrats do not indicate that the expected preferences are incorrect but rather 
that other factors besides partisanship play a larger role.  
can be explained through Through the course of analysis, ppressure from 
extra-governmental factors was hypothesized to play a large role in the actual 
preferences that governments exhibited. The conversation around hydraulic 
fracturing is certainly divided, both on a national and state level. Regardless of their 
partisan affiliation, all governments face pressure from extra-governmental groups. 
Democratic Ggovernments overnments opposed to hydraulic fracturing would 
primarily be subjected to pressures from interest groups and public opinion 
advocating for increased hydraulic fracturing. RepublicanSimilarly, governments 
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that support hydraulic fracturing would primarily face similar pressures from 
groups opposed to hydraulic fracturing. Mixed-partyUndecided governments would 
face balanced pressure from all sides in the hydraulic fracturing debate. The cases 
discussed demonstrate that extra-governmental factors such as interest groups or 
unique geography can influence legislative outcomes. All governments are subjected 
to external pressures and with an issue where public opinion is divided these 
pressures can come from every direction.  Thus, the departures by both Republican 
and Democratic governments from expected preferences regarding stringency of 
legislation can be attributedpartially explained toby pressure from exogenous 
factors advocating for the opposition position from what each party would be 
expected to support. 
Republican governments passed either semi-stringent or stringent 
legislation. It has been established that non-stringent legislation is not likely when 
discussing disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing. This does not 
immediately explain why Republican governments would then pass any legislation 
pertaining to disclosure in hydraulic fracturing, if legislation that is most in line with 
their ideological preferences is unlikely to occur for other reasons. These actions 
cannot simply be explained by expected preferences. Instead, external pressures 
from interest groups and public opinion are more likely to explain the legislation 
that Republican governments enacted. A combination of media attention and 
specific occurrences in given states has resulted in pressure on government to pass 
regulations for the hydraulic fracturing industry. Though a Republican government 
may not be endogenously inclined to enact this type of legislation, sufficient external 
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pressure can sway its opinion. The passage of semi-stringent legislation can be 
interpreted as a concession to public opinion while remaining as close as possible to 
Republican preferences. The stringent bill passed by a Republican government 
represents a unique case where a natural disaster linked to hydraulic fracturing 
precipitously turned public opinion against hydraulic fracturing, which resulted in 
stringent legislation that empowers private citizens to take action against hydraulic 
fracturing.  
Democratic governments also departed from expected preferences. Based 
upon their ideology, tThese governments tendwould be expected to support higher 
levels of government regulation and thus could be predicted to support stringent 
legislation. Stringent legislation is expected to include mandatory disclosure 
mechanisms and provisions to make disclosed information public and allow private 
citizens to act upon the information in some capacity. The Democratic governments 
that passed legislation on this topic did pass some stringent legislation but a larger 
proportion was semi-stringent. This can be explained partially by pressure from 
interest groups advocating against increased regulation. It can also be explained 
partially by a lack of familiarity with hydraulic fracturing in a state. If there was not 
much conversation on the issue there was likely less pressure pushing for stringent 
regulation of hydraulic fracturing. The departure from expected preferences may 
also be associated with the costs associated with large amounts of regulation 
inherent to stringent legislation. Stringent legislation requires the state to monitor 
industry actors to ensure they report information accurately and make that 
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information publicly available. Individual governments may have decided they did 
not want this burden, regardless of their ideological preferences.  
This study cannot make definitive conclusions regarding the reasoning 
behind legislation that was passed. It can note that in many cases the legislation 
departed from expected partisan preferences. Further, it can speculate that other 
forces play a large role in determining the legislation that is passed than does 
partisanship. Extra-governmental pressures, primarily from interest groups or 
naturally occurring events in each state played some part in influencing the 
legislation that was eventually passed. Since the enacted legislation does not align 
well with expected partisan preferences, it is fair to speculate that these extra-
governmental factors play a larger role than partisan preferences in determining 
legislative outcomes. 
 
DISCUSSION OF EXOGENOUS FACTORS’ IMPACT ON LEGISLATION 
It has been established that partisan preferences cannot fully account for the 
legislative outcomes in this study. Thus, there must be other factors at play that can 
help to explain the observed departures from partisan preferences. There is not a 
standardized set of factors that equally affect each case in the study. Rather, each 
case presents unique factors apart from partisan preferences that have had some 
effect on the outcome of legislation. This study will not pinpoint their exact effect 
but rather discuss the possible impact that difference extra-governmental factors 
unique to each case had on the legislative process.  
2012 LEGISLATION 
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Bill Legislature Classification  External Factors 
Indiana HB 1107 Republican Semi 
Criticism from 
environmental 
groups 
Louisiana HB 957 Republican Stringent Natural disaster 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 Republican Semi 
National-level 
attention, criticism 
from environmental 
groups 
 
Legislation passed in 2012 pertaining to disclosure mechanisms that affect 
hydraulic fracturing was significant for a number of reasons. This was the start of 
action surrounding a larger national conversation regarding hydraulic fracturing 
that has continued to the present. Though many governmental and 
nongovernmental actors have discussed hydraulic fracturing for a number of years, 
2012 marked the start of robust legislative action on the topic. This can be 
attributed to a complex interplay of governmental and nongovernmental actors that 
has both influenced public opinion and at times been guided by it. Each of the cases 
from 2012 was significantly impacted either in its creation, its implementation, or 
both by this conversation about hydraulic fracturing on both a state and national 
level. 
INDIANA HOUSE BILL 1107 
Indiana HB 1107 was a semi-stringent bill passed by a Republican 
government. The bill received criticism from some environmental groups because it 
did not go far enough in addressing concerns about hydraulic fracturing in the state. 
It has been compared to the earlier HB 1085, introduced by Representative Winfield 
Moses (D- Fort Wayne). Environmental groups lobbied for HB 1085 over HB 1107. 
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They proposed that HB 1085 was more stringent in its treatment of hydraulic 
fracturing and thus would provide more environmental protections. This bill serves 
as an example of an extra-governmental group influencing the legislative process. Its 
effect should be considered in this case as an example of a factor other than partisan 
preferences that should be considered when examining the entire landscape around 
a bill’s progress through the legislature.  
  
 
This study will only give full consideration to enacted bills. By extension, it 
will also not categorize legislation that was not enacted as stringent/non-stringent. 
It is impossible to fully control for the intentions behind legislation that is 
introduced but not enacted. Some bills may not have been intended seriously by 
their sponsors and thus should not be considered fully next to enacted legislation. 
However, HB 1085 in Indiana is particularly relevant to the discussion around HB 
1107 because environmental groups explicitly held it up as a serious alternative to 
the enacted legislation. HB 1085 was given due consideration by the Indiana House 
of Representatives. In Indiana extra-governmental groups brought HB 1085 to the 
media’s attention during the time that HB 1107 was making its way through the 
State Legislature. Even though HB 1085 was not ultimately enacted it was used as 
an attempt to influence the content of HB 1107, which was enacted.  
Representative Moses’ HB 1085 assigns the task of regulating hydraulic 
fracturing to the Natural Resource Commission. An operator would be required to 
obtain approval for an environmental compliance plan that includes: (1) well 
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location and total depth; (2) a list of injection fluids and propping agents used in the 
hydraulic fracturing process; (3) the chemical constituents and additives used in, 
and wastes generated during, the hydraulic fracturing process; (4) a detailed 
geological analysis of the well and its surrounding area, including the rock type and 
the direction and magnitude of regional tectonic stresses; (5) the impacts of any 
pre-drilling or pre-alteration survey performed on the well with respect to the 
hydraulic fracturing process; and (6) an analysis of whether the proposed hydraulic 
fracturing process will pollute or otherwise endanger water or land in Indiana. It 
also contains a provision that requires the Commission to develop a process 
whereby an operator could be required to disclose a proprietary formula in the case 
of a medical emergency. HB 1085 makes provisions to publicize information 
collected under its purview and it also collects more information than HB 1107. HB 
1085 offers more recourse to people living near proposed hydraulic fracturing sites 
because it makes provisions to grant public access to information. However, this bill 
did not make it out of committee when it was introduced.   
This study will only give full consideration to enacted bills. By extension, it 
will also not categorize legislation that was not enacted as stringent/non-stringent. 
It is impossible to fully control for the intentions behind legislation that is 
introduced but not enacted. Some bills may not have been intended seriously by 
their sponsors and thus should not be considered fully next to enacted legislation. 
However, HB 1085 in Indiana is particularly relevant to the discussion around HB 
1107 because environmental groups explicitly held it up as a serious alternative to 
the enacted legislation. HB 1085 was given due consideration by the Indiana House 
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of Representatives. In Indiana extra-governmental groups brought HB 1085 to the 
media’s attention during the time that HB 1107 was making its way through the 
State Legislature. Even though HB 1085 was not ultimately enacted it was used as 
an attempt to influence the content of HB 1107, which was enacted.  
HB 1107 was introduced by a Republican and successfully made it through 
both Chambers and then received the governor’s approval. HB 1085 was introduced 
by a Democrat and did not make it out of the House committee where it was first 
introduced. It is possible to attribute this pattern of success and failure respectively 
to the content of each bill. HB 1085 proposed that more information be collected 
about hydraulic fracturing and also that this information be made public.  It may be 
the case that there was no support in Indiana in 2012 for these types of measures.  
A bill that was proposed in committee but did not make it further in the 
legislative process may not be an accurate reflection of the entire party’s views; it 
may be a personal project for the bill’s sponsor. In this case, HB 1085 does not deal 
with district-specific issues, which lends credence to the theory that it was not 
merely a personal project for its sponsor. Furthermore, the media coverage of the 
bill characterized it as a Democrat-backed piece of legislation, which indicates it had 
the support of a reasonable portion of the party beyond the initial sponsor.  
It is also necessary to consider whether politics played a role in the relative 
success of the two bills. Indiana’s government is controlled entirely by Republicans 
so one must consider whether a bill introduced by a Republican would be received 
more favorably than one introduced by a Democrat. It is difficult to separate this 
question from the first, whether the Democrat-backed bill was simply too far to the 
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left for Indiana’s legislators to support. The different reception that the two bills 
received leads to the conclusion that the party of the introductory legislator and the 
content of the bill are intimately connected. A bill introduced by legislators in the 
minority party are an accurate reflection of the state’s public’s views. However, 
there were also many environmental interest groups in Indiana that advocated for 
HB 1085 while both bills were under consideration in the State House so it seems 
that some portion of the population did support HB 1085.  
This general principle is important to note in conjunction with the rise of 
partisan influence in past decades. There is an intimate connection between sharply 
drawn partisan lines and a minority-introduced bill’s failure in the legislature. It 
may be the case that the minority legislator introduced a bill that is simply 
ideologically unattractive to the majority, thus it fails. However, it may also be the 
case that the bill fails explicitly because a member of the minority introduced it. It is 
difficult to separate these two intentions and they may in fact be present in tandem. 
In the case of Indiana HB 1085, it is likely that the bill was both ideologically 
objectionable due to its more stringent treatment of hydraulic fracturing and 
politically objectionable to the Republican minority because it was introduced by 
Democrats and supported by environmental interest groups, who are traditionally 
seen as Democrats’ allies.  
Indiana HB 1107 demonstrates the importance of extra-governmental 
groups in the trajectory of legislative action. This case shows that a dissatisfied 
lobby can make its opinion known throughout the state and can affect the reception 
of a bill. In this case, extra-governmental groups made their opinion known 
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throughout the legislative process by advocating for a competing bill to the one that 
was eventually passed. They were ultimately unsuccessful with HB 1085 but the 
conversation they started indicates dissatisfaction among some portion of Indiana’s 
electorate and will likely ensure that hydraulic fracturing remains a topic of debate 
for the State Legislature.  
LOUISIANA HOUSE BILL 957 
Louisiana HB 957 was a stringent bill passed by a Republican government. As 
discussed with Indiana HB 1107, extra-governmental actors can play a large role in 
its eventual success or failure. Unlike the examples in Indiana, it does not always 
require existing problems with the legislation were not needed for 
nongovernmental actors to take public action. Louisiana HB 957 did not receive 
much attention from media or environmentalist groups. However, the state has 
been heavily focused on the issue of hydraulic fracturing since the beginning of 
August in 2012, due to a large-scale environmental disaster known as the sinkhole 
at Bayou Corne. This environmental disaster is another exogenous factor that 
undoubtedly played a role in shaping the legislation that the Louisiana government 
passed. Here, the Republican government deviated sharply from its expected 
preferences so factors other than partisanship must be considered.   
Governor Bobby Jindal declared a state of emergency after the sinkhole first 
opened in the southwest corner of the state. There has been a constant statewide 
watch on this area for the past year and a half, though little remedial action has been 
taken. The presence of the sinkhole has been attributed to the many hydraulic 
fracturing wells throughout the state. The resultant seismic activity and the state’s 
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unstable topography are thought to be the causes of the sinkhole. Groups that 
formed in opposition to hydraulic fracturing in Louisiana played a previously 
unexpectedly large role in lobbying for environmental protections against hydraulic 
fracturing operations in the state due to the increased media attention that these 
issues received.  
The sinkhole is relevant to the conversation around Louisiana HB 957 due to 
the coincidence of its appearance and the bill’s passage and later implementation. 
HB 957 made its way through the Louisiana state legislature while warnings about 
the potential impact of hydraulic fracturing on the Louisiana landscape were heard 
around the state. It is reasonable to speculate that the elevated statewide profile of 
hydraulic fracturing may have lent the bill media attention and helped with its 
passage in both chambers of the Louisiana General Assembly.  
A Democrat in an all-Republican controlled state introduced this bill, yet it 
passed with high margins in both chambers and relatively quickly. The text of the 
bill can easily be interpreted as being in compliance with the expected Democratic 
preferences on this issue. However, there is also an open-ended clause that grants 
discretionary power to the Commissioner of Conservation. This ambiguity could 
also work in favor of a more stereotypically Republican position because the 
Commissioner may choose to take a very small role. Thus the bill appeals to both 
parties. It is possible that the large-scale environmental consequences that have 
been attributed to hydraulic fracturing in Louisiana have pushed public opinion 
further against hydraulic fracturing, regardless of which party voters identify with. 
If this is the case, it is to be expected that Louisiana Republicans would be more 
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likely to support legislation limiting the proliferation of hydraulic fracturing, or even 
removing existing outfits, than Republicans on a national level.  
This case lends credence to the theory that partisan preferences over an 
issue play an important role but larger issues that are present in a state can result in 
deviation from expectations. This assertion does not contradict predictions about 
partisan preferences; specifically, it does not invalidate their influence over 
decisions that states make. Rather, this suggests that it is necessary to examine 
expected actions of Democrats and Republicans under normal circumstances and 
then consider whether unique factors exist that could result in deviation from 
predicted preferences of either party. In this case, the conversation around the 
impact of the natural disaster in Louisiana places partisan preferences within a 
larger hierarchy of factors that all influence legislative action.  
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE BILL 1950 
Pennsylvania HB 1950 was a semi-stringent piece of legislation passed by a 
Republican government. This is another example of a bill whose reception statewide 
was impacted by interest groups that took a stance against it. This bill has received 
significant criticism from environmental organizations because it fails to 
acknowledge the statewide impacts from drilling. They argue that HB 1950 
discriminates against non-drilling communities, which can be impacted by 
increased traffic and congestion, placement of pipelines and compressor stations, 
and changes in population and cost of living due to drilling. Similarly to the Indiana 
case, organizing by environmental groups should be considered when examining 
the final legislative outcome. There was a departure from Republicans’ expected 
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preferences in this case, thus there must be some other factors at play that can help 
explain the bill that was passed.  
These Environmental groups are unhappy that HB 1950 does not provide 
any compensation for communities that aren’t directly on hydraulic fracturing sites. 
Interest groups posit that the bill creates an unfair environment wherein drilling 
communities can not only mitigate the negative impacts of drilling, but also enhance 
many other areas of the community while non-drilling communities are not offered 
any of these opportunities. They argue that the information disclosed through 
provisions in HB 1950 empowers drilling communities to act in response to harms 
from hydraulic fracturing opportunities but non-drilling communities that also 
experience negative effects do not have the same ability. Many groups point to 
Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming, all of which have 
implemented taxes or fees around similar issues of environmental harms that 
benefit all of their residents either through education, community programs, or tax 
reductions- not just those who live in communities directly impacted by hydraulic 
fracturing.  
Pennsylvania HB 1950 was an extremely high profile piece of legislation that 
faced intense oversight by extra-governmental groups at every step of the legislative 
process. This was due largely to the extensive conversation that was going on in 
Pennsylvania around hydraulic fracturing at the time, which continues to the 
present day. This bill received disproportionate national media attention compared 
to the average amount for state regulations, which is evident in the number of 
groups outside Pennsylvania that took an interest in it. The heightened scrutiny 
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resulted in more opposition to the bill than what would have occurred in a similar 
case with less media scrutiny. It follows that the opposition that HB 1950 faced 
uniquely affected its language and progress through the legislature.  
Pennsylvania HB 1950 provides interesting insight into the intersection of 
partisanship and politically influential extra-governmental factors. It is difficult to 
separate the effect of national media attention from that of a highly partisan debate 
within the state but undoubtedly both play a crucial role. Pennsylvania is the center 
of a larger national debate on hydraulic fracturing, which results in stronger 
pressure for legislators to take sides on the issue. It has also provided ample 
material to fuel interest groups that advocate against expanding the hydraulic 
fracturing industry in the state. The Republican-controlled government can be 
considered to be largely at odds with the environmental groups in Pennsylvania. 
Thus, these two groups hold rather strong, diametrically opposed opinions that the 
government attempted to resolve with a semi-stringent bill that incorporates some 
points from both sides.  
It is debatable whether this bill fully addressed the concerns of both sides. 
Many environmental groups in Pennsylvania contend that their input was ignored 
throughout the bill’s drafting. They want a major overhaul of the legislation that 
takes a firmer stance against hydraulic fracturing. The initial bill was passed entirely 
along party lines, with only Republicans voting in favor. The Republican majority 
attempted to placate its minority counterpart and interest groups from the other 
side but it did not succeed in addressing their concerns. Republicans’ expected 
preferences would be toward less regulation of the hydraulic fracturing industry 
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and it is possible to interpret the regulations in HB 1950 as a practical concession to 
the necessities of political compromise with the Democratic minority, whose 
preferences are toward more stringent regulations. Pennsylvania also occupies a 
unique place in the national debate on hydraulic fracturing due to its massive 
deposits of natural gas. This led to stronger opinions with regards to Pennsylvania’s 
future on both sides of the hydraulic fracturing debate and almost certainly 
impacted the reception that HB 1950 received on both sides of the aisle.  
Further, HB 1950 has become a major talking point in the 2014 election; 
every Democratic candidate for governor has mentioned plans to significantly 
amend the existing legislation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned much 
of the bill on the grounds that is violates portions of the state constitution that 
discuss natural resource management. The conversation around hydraulic 
fracturing in Pennsylvania will continue into the next electoral cycle, likely centered 
on either overhauling HB 1950 or writing entirely new and potentially more 
stringent legislation.  
LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN 2012 
Republican-controlled governments passed all of the bills that pertain to 
disclosure regarding hydraulic fracturing in 2012. There were two bills labeled as 
semi-stringent and one labeled as stringent. Republican-controlled governments 
would be expected to pass non-stringent legislation, but because all the bills pertain 
specifically to disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing, expected preferences 
do not necessarily apply. This is a relatively niche topic that can be interpreted as a 
signal toward at least semi-stringent legislation. The cases mentioned support the 
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hypothesis that non-stringent legislation pertaining to disclosure is unlikely to 
occur.  
In all the cases from 2012, there also exist mitigating factors that would have 
influenced public opinion toward more stringent legislation than would otherwise 
be expected from Republican-controlled governments.  The Indiana case 
demonstrated strong opposition from environmental groups to an enacted bill. 
These groups advocated very publicly for an alternate bill during both bills’ process 
through the Indiana legislature. They argued that the alternate bill’s provisions 
regarding publicizing information were vital in giving citizens a voice in the future 
of the hydraulic fracturing industry in the state. It is possible that the Republican 
majority responded to this pressure by passing legislation that was not in line with 
their expected preferences but rather closer to the median opinion.  
A similar situation occurred with environmental interest groups in 
Pennsylvania regarding HB 1950, a semi-stringent bill passed by a Republican 
government. There was strong public opinion against fracking that translated to 
criticism of HB 1950 because it did not sufficiently reduce harms from hydraulic 
fracturing for the entire state. This case also presents strong negative response from 
citizens toward hydraulic fracturing. This is similar to the pressure exerted by 
interest groups in the sense that it is from a nongovernment actor but it can also be 
considered a less organized, more organic force of opposition. When comparing the 
case in Indiana to that in Pennsylvania it is interesting to consider the effect that 
opposition from interest groups versus citizens has in affecting legislation. Interest 
groups are frequently highly organized lobbies that can push forcefully on a single 
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piece of legislation and they can be considered efficient in accomplishing their goals. 
In contrast, citizen opposition is usually less well defined but it can have 
proportionately more power if it manages to organize itself because it plays into 
politicians’ fears around reelection. Pennsylvania presented both these pressures to 
Republican elected officials. The Republican-controlled government may have 
passed semi-stringent legislation in response to pressures from the Democratic 
minority and environmental interest groups.  
Louisiana HB 957 was a stringent bill passed by a Republican government 
and it also does not align with expected preferences for Republican elected officials. 
In this case, the unexpectedly stringent legislation can also be attributed to extra-
governmental pressures that swayed public opinion. The state experienced a severe 
natural disaster that was attributed to hydraulic fracturing. This swayed citizens’ 
opinions firmly against hydraulic fracturing, which would translate to support for 
stringent legislation. They in turn made this opinion known to Louisiana elected 
officials. Strong pressure from citizens helps explain the departure from expected 
preferences among Republican politicians.  
All the cases from 2012 demonstrate a departure from expected partisan 
preferences. Thus, it is fair to assume that a combination of other factors is 
responsible for the legislation that each state government passed. This study will 
not make definitive statements about the causes behind each bill’s passage. 
However, it will note that factors other than partisan preference appear to play a 
large role in shaping legislation.  
2013 LEGISLATION  
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Bill Legislature Classification  External Factors 
Arkansas HB 2001 Mixed Semi 
Mixed legislature, little media 
attention 
Illinois SB 1715 Democratic Stringent 
Attention from environmental 
groups; multi-year planning 
Illinois SB 2155 Democratic N/A Part of above bill 
Rhode Island SB 
725 Democratic Semi 
Little media attention, deals with 
disclosure more broadly than 
just fracking 
 
Legislation passed in 2013 pertaining to disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic 
fracturing was significant for a number of reasons. The legislation continued a 
national conversation around hydraulic fracturing and resulted in markedly more 
skeptical treatment of the hydraulic fracturing industry by government and media 
sources. The added information resulted in national and state-level media treating 
hydraulic fracturing in a more nuanced way, with stronger positive and negative 
reactions to the issue. That is to say proponents of hydraulic fracturing sought to 
expand more aggressively while opponents sought greater environmental 
protections.  Similarly to legislation from the previous year, patterns in 2013 
legislation can be explained by a complex interplay of governmental and 
nongovernmental actors that have both influenced public opinion and at times been 
guided by it. Each of the cases from 2013 was significantly impacted either in its 
creation, its implementation, or both by the conversation about hydraulic fracturing 
on both a state and national level. Similarly to the cases from 2012, there were 
several departures from expected partisan preferences in 2013. The following 
exogenous factors should be considered as partial influences on the final legislation 
that was passed in each state.  
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ARKANSAS HOUSE BILL 2001 
Arkansas HB 2001 was a semi-stringent bill that is unique because it comes 
from a mixed party government. A Democrat held the governor’s seat while 
Republicans held both houses of the state’s legislature. The case was further 
complicated by the narrow margin by which Republicans won the Arkansas House 
of Representatives. In 2012 control of the State House switched from 54-46 (D-R) to 
48-51 (D-R). When one considers expected legislative behaviors from split 
governments, especially ones with a narrow margin for the majority, legislation that 
is very close to the median opinion on an issue could be expected. In this case, there 
is no clear national or Arkansas state-level consensus around hydraulic fracturing 
and thus it could be expected that a bill would be passed that does not clearly fall on 
either side of the issue. Arkansas HB 2001 does cede some ground to opponents of 
hydraulic fracturing who call for a more transparent process. It also allows for 
hydraulic fracturing operations to proceed with little opportunity for pushback from 
landowners. The intent is veiled, which could be considered an intentional product 
of the mixed party government that produced the legislation. The ambiguity allowed 
the legislature to pass a bill that was acceptable to all camps.  
It is inaccurate to characterize all semi-stringent bills as a product of a 
divided government. Many states have governments controlled by one party and yet 
they pass semi-stringent legislation as defined in this study. It is necessary to 
examine the larger context in which legislation is passed. Often there are other 
strong voices from interest groups, other government agencies, etc. that can 
influence legislation. It is more accurate to ascribe semi-stringent legislation around 
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disclosure in hydraulic fracturing as a product of a state that has divided opinions 
on the issue. Though there may be a consensus among elected officials, the influence 
of public opinion cannot be dismissed when considering legislative outcomes, 
especially ones that would not normally follow from a state government’s partisan 
composition. 
In the case of Arkansas HB 2001 the mixed party government may certainly 
be a factor in the semi-stringent bill that the state legislature produced. The lack of a 
strong partisan majority within the legislature lends credence to this interpretation 
of events. It is fair to assume that the close margins by which Republicans hold the 
State House and Senate, coupled with the Democratic governor, contributed to the 
middle of the road bill that Arkansas enacted.  
However, the semi-stringent bill may also be the result of extra-
governmental voices that steered the debate. The state saw robust organizing 
around the issue of hydraulic fracturing in 2011-2012. Interest groups rallied 
against hydraulic fracturing in Arkansas after several wells exploded around the 
state, sending petition signatures to the State Legislature asking for a cessation to 
hydraulic fracturing. This in turn led to a statewide conversation centered on the 
future of the hydraulic fracturing industry in Arkansas. There was no single answer 
that came from this discussion. This may have given legislators the impression that 
no single opinion prevailed among voters. Thus, a bill that appealed to both camps 
would have been an attractive option to Arkansas state legislators. A bill classified 
as semi-stringent would be the most logical way to accomplish this goal because it 
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addresses disclosure to some extent but it does not curtail the industry as heavily as 
a stringent bill would.  
In the case of Arkansas HB 2001 there is some compelling evidence that 
suggests the role of a mixed party government was stronger than that of interest 
groups. For the entire time that a mixed party government was in control in 
Arkansas it exerted the same influence over legislation that it passed; that is to say it 
was a constant influence over the entire time period that this study considered. In 
contrast, interest groups’ influence changed with time. Interest groups usually 
organize around key events and then their influence wanes over time until another 
issue emerges. In Arkansas, groups against hydraulic fracturing organized in 2012 
in response to several accidents but this was not a sustainable infrastructure. Thus, 
their ability to influence legislation that was passed over a year later seems 
questionable. Legislators may have recalled the message of extra-governmental 
groups but it is likely that the desire to reach a consensus may have superseded 
such concerns. Although this case did adhere to expected partisan preferences it is 
important to consider different factors in assessing the legislative process for each 
bill included in this study.  
 
   
 
 
ILLINOIS SENATE BILLS 1715 and 2155 
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Illinois SB 1715 was a stringent piece of legislation passed by a Democratic 
government. This bill demonstrates the effect that timely action from extra-
governmental groups can have upon the public reception that an enacted bill 
receives. Immediately after it was enacted, SB 1715 was praised for its strict 
environmental protection standards. However, after the draft rules were released 
many environmental groups criticized the bill because it did not sufficiently provide 
public access to information, and by extension it did not do enough for 
environmental protection. The bill was also the culmination of a multi-year process 
in the state that brought together stakeholders from both parties, industry, and 
environmental interest groups. There was support for the bill from this diverse 
coalition throughout the duration of the legislative process but environmental 
groups later changed their views. Their opposition to the final version of draft rules 
ultimately changed the way that the bill was received in Illinois.  
Illinois SB 2155 was passed by at the same time as SB 1715, by the same 
Democratic government. It is unique among the legislation discussed because it was 
not intended to stand alone. Rather, it should be considered an addendum to Illinois 
SB 1715. SB 2155 addresses disclosure in hydraulic fracturing but it amends 
existing Illinois codes rather than proposing entirely new regulations. It should be 
treated as a part of the SB 1715 “package” of legislation, thus it will not receive a 
separate stringency rating. It received much less media attention than its larger 
counterpart, thus the effect of extra-governmental groups is difficult to isolate. In 
this case it is more appropriate to assess the overall climate surrounding hydraulic 
fracturing at the time in Illinois.  
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Illinois SB 1715 was an extremely high profile piece of legislation that faced 
intense oversight by extra-governmental groups at every step of the legislative 
process. This was due in part to the extensive conversation that was going on in 
Illinois around hydraulic fracturing at the time, which continues to the present day. 
This bill also faced extremely high scrutiny due to the time at which it was 
introduced. A national conversation about hydraulic fracturing had been going on 
for some time and this added to the collective consciousness of the issue. The Illinois 
bill is not unique in this regard, but rather each bill from 2013 was subjected to 
more scrutiny compared to what could have been expected in past years. The 
Illinois bill faced higher scrutiny due to all the attention that hydraulic fracturing 
had received in that state. As time goes on it is likely that legislation pertaining to 
hydraulic fracturing will continue to garner high levels of press coverage. Thus it is 
somewhat misleading to say that Illinois SB 1715 received unusually high scrutiny. 
Instead, it is more likely that the “heightened” level of scrutiny for this type of 
legislation will soon become the norm.  
There was significant attention around hydraulic fracturing at the time that 
SB 1715 and 2155 were being drafted. SB 1715 and its counterpart in the State 
House, HB 2615, were the culmination of a long conversation around hydraulic 
fracturing in Illinois, which also included SB 2155. The primary House and Senate 
sponsors of these bills worked to create a diverse coalition of industry experts, 
environmental groups, and state and local government officials to support their 
bills. This resulted in support from many different sides that allowed all three bills 
to pass with high margins. The multi-year stakeholder buy-in that legislators 
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created ensured that the legislation itself would have robust support. This is 
interesting to consider in conjunction with the loss of goodwill that followed the 
proposed DNR rules. Both cases demonstrate the importance of extra-governmental 
actors in affecting legislators’ actions. It is evident that under certain conditions 
these groups can sway elected officials from acting according to their expected 
preferences.  
SB 1715 was the result of action by legislators on both sides of the aisle and 
from different branches of government. Both the legislature and the governor had a 
role in advocating for the legislation. The bill brought together politicians on a 
rather divisive issue. This is notable because Illinois has a reputation for extreme 
partisanship in its government. The focus of the legislation certainly played a role in 
this; hydraulic fracturing was and continues to be a popular topic in the state and 
around the country, so it was likely at the front of politicians’ minds. It is also 
necessary to examine the lengthy process that led to the enactment of SB 1715. 
Various actors in Illinois discussed hydraulic fracturing legislation for several years 
prior to its enactment. This drawn out conversation allowed input from industry, 
environmental groups, and members of the executive and legislative branches. The 
bill covered more topics related to hydraulic fracturing due to the range of opinions 
that helped shape it.  
SB 2155 was likely introduced separately because the original text of the bill 
dealt with the existing Illinois Metropolitan Water Reclamation District Act. SB 2155 
provided that settlements and demands, including associated attorney's fees and 
costs, together with claims for deprivation of any constitutional or statutory right, 
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were added to the list of costs which may not be included in the district's annual tax 
levy. As it was originally written, this bill did not deal with hydraulic fracturing. 
Instead, it was the Illinois State House that added an amendment to the Hydraulic 
Fracturing Regulatory Act that stated the Illinois Department of Natural Resources 
must forward the necessary information regarding hydraulic fracturing to each 
Chief County Assessment Officer. This amendment also changed the Property Tax 
Extension Limitation Law in the Property Tax Code, stating that "new property” 
includes any increase in assessed value due to oil or gas production that was not 
produced in or accounted for during the previous levy year. These two changes both 
deal with existing Illinois legislation and thus it was perhaps more politically 
expedient to add them to a separate piece of legislation rather than the already 
cumbersome SB 1715.  
Illinois SB 2155 did not receive significant media attention, although 
hydraulic fracturing was a popular topic in the state at the time of its 
implementation. This oversight can be attributed to the attention given to the 
better-known SB 1715, which eventually became the Hydraulic Fracturing 
Regulatory Act. SB 2155 was not targeted by extra-governmental groups, nor was it 
explicitly part of the multi-year coalition building processes around hydraulic 
fracturing in Illinois. This lends credence to the idea that it was always intended as 
an addition to the larger SB 1715. It also makes it difficult to anticipate preferences 
over the legislation. In this case it is most accurate to defer to the influences over 
behavior that affected SB 1715. 
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Both bills from Illinois demonstrate the importance of considering multiple 
factors that may have influenced legislative outcomes. This case demonstrates 
consistency with expected partisan preferences but there is evidence that 
exogenous factors also played a role the legislation that was eventually passed. This 
study will not weigh different factors that affect legislative outcomes but rather note 
that multiple elements played a role.  
RHODE ISLAND SENATE BILL 725 
Rhode Island SB 725 was a semi-stringent bill enacted by a Democratic 
government. It differs from previously discussion legislation because did not receive 
significant media attention during its drafting or after its implementation. Thus it is 
likely that another explanation exists for its deviation from expected partisan 
preferences. The bill deals broadly with disclosure, rather than only addressing 
disclosure mechanisms that affect the hydraulic fracturing industry. This general 
focus likely contributed both to the lack of media attention and the departure from 
expected Democratic preferences that SB 725 demonstrated.  
Though hydraulic fracturing has captured a great deal of national attention, 
Rhode Island SB 725 was not widely mentioned. This is likely due to twocan be 
attributed to several factors. First, the bill does not deal exclusively with hydraulic 
fracturing. The information requirements in SB 725 address both the oil and gas 
industries but there is nothing that ties this bill specifically to the national 
conversation around hydraulic fracturing. The bill may have also received less 
national attention because it did not deal with disclosure relating specifically to 
hydraulic fracturing. SB 725 calls for the Commissioner of Energy Resources to 
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collect information about the industry but it does not address any of the unique 
technical or social aspects of disclosure pertaining to hydraulic fracturing. Unlike 
some of the more stringent disclosure requirements in other states, the Rhode 
Island bill did not explicitly call for specific information to be shared. The general 
nature of the bill likely contributed to the low level of scrutiny it was subjected to.  
In this case, there is little evidence to suggest that extra-governmental 
groups are responsible for the deviation from expected preferences for the 
Democratic government in Rhode Island. Instead, it seems likely that the unspecific 
language in the bill led to the interpretation of its regulation of hydraulic fracturing 
as only semi-stringent. Although it does address some issues of information 
disclosure it does not explicitly seek to limit the proliferation of the hydraulic 
fracturing industry. This could be complicated by the general lack of activity around 
hydraulic fracturing in the state prior to 2014. Cases in Louisiana and Illinois 
demonstrate that governments generally shift to more stringent treatment of 
hydraulic fracturing over time, regardless of which party controls the government. 
This can be attributed to an increase in public knowledge of the topic and 
corresponding attention from various extra-governmental sources. Rhode Island 
may pass a more specific and more stringent bill in the future if the hydraulic 
fracturing industry expands in the state. This bill also demonstrates a departure 
from expected partisan preferences. In this case, it is possible that the lack of 
familiarity with hydraulic fracturing in Rhode Island contributed to a more general 
bill that was not as stringent as could be expected from a Democratic government.  
LEGISLATIVE TRENDS IN 2013 
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Democrat-controlled governments passed all but one of the bills that pertain 
to disclosure regarding hydraulic fracturing in 2013. In this group there were two 
bills labeled as semi-stringent and one labeled as stringent. This is not the expected 
action from Democrat-controlled governments and in fact matches the classification 
of bills passed by Republican controlled governments. A mixed-party government 
passed the final piece of legislation, which was also semi-stringent. The lack of clear 
partisan preferences on this topic seems to indicate the influence of extra-
governmental groups takes precedenceis necessary to consider when examining the 
stringency of enacted legislation.  
In all the cases pertaining to bills from Democratic governments that were 
semi-stringent there exist mitigating factors that affected their classification. Illinois 
SB 2155 was an addition to another piece of legislation that was not intended to be 
considered solely on its own merits. Though it is not stringent itself, its parent 
legislation is. Thus, the Democratic legislators that introduced both bills were likely 
less concerned with the explicit stringency of this smaller bill.  
Illinois SB 1715 was a stringent piece of legislation that aligned with 
expected Democratic preferences. The state had robust activity from both public 
and private sectors around hydraulic fracturing, which culminated in a diverse 
coalition that supported this bill. However, extra-governmental groups later 
criticized the bill as insufficiently stringent due to the rules promulgated by the DNR 
based upon SB 1715. Thus, the bill itself is stringent but the actions of a separate 
government body have been linked to it and harmed its overall reception. This case 
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demonstrates that even when expected partisan preferences are observed it is still 
necessary to consider other factors that have an impact on the legislative process.  
In the case of Rhode Island SB 725, the bill in question did not pertain only to 
disclosure in hydraulic fracturing. It addressed the oil and gas industries more 
broadly, likely because there has been little action around hydraulic fracturing in 
the state. It is possible that the Democratic government would pass a stringent bill 
in the future if the need arose.  
The final bill from 2013, Arkansas HB 2001, was unique because it came from 
a mixed-party government. It was semi-stringent, which was in line with expected 
preferences from this government. The reason behind its level of stringency is less 
clear. There was certainly a lack of a strong partisan majority in the state, which 
exerted a steady pressure toward a median legislative outcome that was acceptable 
to both parties. There was also some organizing from interest groups in the state. 
Though these groups’ main activity occurred before HB 2001 was under 
consideration, the residual impact of their lobbying may have had some effect on 
elected officials. However, the gap between the majority of extra-governmental 
groups’ organizing in 2012 and the introduction and passage of HB 2001 in 2013 is 
indicative that the split-party government had a larger effect in the passage of a 
semi-stringent bill.  
 
 
LEGISLATIVE TRENDS BETWEEN YEARS 
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This study did not examine in detail the causes behind shifts in legislative 
trends. It sought to examine the impact of partisanship on preferences regarding 
information disclosure in hydraulic fracturing. It did not find compelling evidence to 
support the claim that partisan preferences play a large role in legislative outcomes. 
Logically, there must be other factors that can account for legislative outcomes, 
particularly those that depart from expected partisan preferences. The study will 
speculate as to possible causes for these observed departures from expected 
preferences, establishing avenues for further research. 
Republican governments enacted all the legislation pertaining to disclosure 
in hydraulic fracturing in 2012. There were only 3 bills total on the subject, two 
semi-stringent and one stringent. In contrast, Democratic governments introduced 
all the bills but one from 2013. A mixed-party government, an anomaly itself in this 
study, introduced the last bill from 2013. There was a similarly small sample size in 
2013, with two semi-stringent bills and one stringent bill- though the stringent bill 
had a second bill that was considered an addendum.  
It is possible that the shift from Republican governments to Democratic 
governments can be attributed to the larger shift within the national and state-level 
conversation about hydraulic fracturing. Over time, media coverage of hydraulic 
fracturing indicates that it has been regarded with increasing skepticism. There was 
more critical coverage of the industry and more support for environmental 
protections on this topic.  An increasing familiarity with the process of hydraulic 
fracturing, including potential negative side effects, may have shifted public opinion 
toward more regulation of the hydraulic fracturing industry. This stance pairs more 
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closely with expected Democratic preferences over the issue, thus these 
governments may have been more inclined to take action on this issue in 2013. 
Similarly, Republicans were more likely to take action in 2012 when public opinion 
was more in line with their expected preferences against regulation. This is only one 
of many possible explanations for this observed shift. Further study would be 
prudent to determine the reason behind different governments addressing the issue 
of information disclosure in hydraulic fracturing legislation in the different years 
studied.  .  
There is a surprising similarity in types of bills between years. That is to say, 
both the 2012 and 2013 samples have one stringent bill and a number of semi-
stringent bills. This seems to indicate that other forces beyond partisan preferences 
influenced the final bill. Specific instances are discussed for each case, but overall a 
discernable trend emerges. Interest groups, public opinion, natural phenomena, or a 
broad legislative focus impact legislative outcomes. Arguably, these various factors 
have a stronger effect than expected partisan preferences because there were more 
instances of legislation that did not match with expected preferences than those that 
did. This study cannot comment definitively on the relative impact of partisanship 
or exogenous factors but it does note that both had an affect on the legislation that 
was enacted.  
A LACK OF NON-STRINGENT BILLS 
None of the cases in this study were labeled as non-stringent. Upon first 
inspection, this could be considered an unexpected outcome. Republican 
governments passed three of the bills examined and their predicted preferences 
 100 
seem to indicate that they would support and enact non-stringent legislation. This 
preference stems from their expected response to the high level of government 
oversight necessary for stringent legislation. They prefer low levels of government 
regulation and thus should be expected to prefer non-stringent legislation.  
However, it is necessary to examine other factors when making the final 
determination of a given party’s preferences over legislation. Upon further 
reflection, it is not entirely logical to expect non-stringent legislation when 
considering disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing. By their nature, 
disclosure mechanisms provide more information upon a given topic.  When these 
mechanisms are applied to environmental issues they result in more information 
that can then be used to prevent certain actions that cause unacceptable levels of 
environmental harm. Disclosure mechanisms can also be paired with other 
provisions that make the disclosed information public or empower private citizens 
to act upon this information. Thus, disclosure mechanisms in environmental 
legislation, especially when paired with other provisions, are linked to 
environmental protection. Non-stringent legislation, which here is defined as 
legislation that does include reporting for industry apart from the existing 
FracFocus database or provisions to make information public, would not logically 
apply to bills that deal specifically with disclosure in hydraulic fracturing. In a sense, 
non-stringent bills do not significantly alter the status quo in a state with regard to 
information disclosure of hydraulic fracturing practices. The A non-stringent 
definition certainly fits for other bills that regulate hydraulic fracturing in different 
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ways but it is understandable why disclosure bills would not commonly be non-
stringent.  
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING EXOGENOUS FACTORS CONCLUSION 
This study anticipated that Democrats would be more likely to support 
environmental protections than Republicans. It went on to define disclosure as a 
policy tool that led to more protection with regard to hydraulic fracturing. This 
definition was accepted with the caveat that disclosure only leads to increased 
environmental protections when it is paired with other provisions that make the 
information public or otherwise empower private citizens to act in response to 
disclosed information. In the context of this study, Democratic governments were 
assumed to have a preference for stringent legislation, Republican governments for 
non-stringent legislation, and split-party governments for semi-stringent legislation 
with regard to hydraulic fracturing.  
The study found that both Republican and Democratic governments 
departed from expected preferences more frequently than they adhered to them. 
There was only one case of a mixed-party government and it did adhere to its 
expected preference. These departures from expected preferences by Republicans 
and Democrats can be explained through pressure from extra-governmental factors. 
The conversation around hydraulic fracturing is certainly divided, both on a 
national and state level. Democratic governments would primarily be subjected to 
pressures from interest groups and public opinion advocating for increased 
hydraulic fracturing. Republican governments would primarily face similar 
pressures from groups opposed to hydraulic fracturing. Mixed-party governments 
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would face balanced pressure from all sides in the hydraulic fracturing debate. The 
cases discussed demonstrate that extra-governmental factors such as interest 
groups or unique geography can influence legislative outcomes. All governments are 
subjected to external pressures and with an issue where public opinion is divided 
these pressures can come from every direction.  Thus, the departures by both 
Republican and Democratic governments from expected preferences regarding 
stringency of legislation can be attributed to pressure from exogenous factors 
advocating for the opposition position from what each party would be expected to 
support. 
Republican governments passed either semi-stringent or stringent 
legislation. It has been established that non-stringent legislation is not likely when 
discussing disclosure mechanisms in hydraulic fracturing. This does not 
immediately explain why Republican governments would then pass any legislation 
pertaining to disclosure in hydraulic fracturing. These actions cannot simply be 
explained by expected preferences. Instead, external pressures from interest groups 
and public opinion are more likely to explain the legislation that Republican 
governments enacted. A combination of media attention and specific occurrences in 
given states has resulted in pressure on government to pass regulations for the 
hydraulic fracturing industry. Though a Republican government may not be 
endogenously inclined to enact this type of legislation, sufficient external pressure 
can sway its opinion. The passage of semi-stringent legislation can be interpreted as 
a concession to public opinion while remaining as close as possible to Republican 
preferences. The stringent bill passed by a Republican government represents a 
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unique case where a natural disaster linked to hydraulic fracturing precipitously 
turned public opinion against hydraulic fracturing, which resulted in stringent 
legislation that empowers private citizens to take action against hydraulic 
fracturing.  
Democratic governments also departed from expected preferences. These 
governments tend to support higher levels of government regulation and thus could 
be predicted to support stringent legislation. Stringent legislation is expected to 
include mandatory disclosure mechanisms and provisions to make disclosed 
information public and allow private citizens to act upon the information in some 
capacity. The Democratic governments that passed legislation on this topic did pass 
some stringent legislation but a larger proportion was semi-stringent. This can be 
explained partially by pressure from interest groups advocating against increased 
regulation. It can also be explained partially by a lack of familiarity with hydraulic 
fracturing in a state. If there was not much conversation on the issue there was 
likely less pressure pushing for stringent regulation of hydraulic fracturing. The 
departure from expected preferences may also be associated with the costs 
associated with large amounts of regulation inherent to stringent legislation. 
Stringent legislation requires the state to monitor industry actors to ensure they 
report information accurately and make that information publicly available. 
Individual governments may have decided they did not want this burden, regardless 
of their ideological preferences.  
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This study sought to examine the effect of partisans preferences on 
legislation passed regarding information disclosure in hydraulic fracturing. It found 
that the enacted legislation examined departed from expected preferences more 
frequently than it adhered to them. This indicates that other factors must play a role 
in shaping the legislation that is passed. The study can only make definitive 
statements regarding the observed adherence or departure from hypothesized 
preferences based on partisan affiliation. However, because these predicted 
preferences were largely inconsistent with observed results, it is appropriate to 
theorize about other possible causes. These factors vary between states and 
represent promising directions for future study.  
External factors that are unique to particular states also help explain 
departures from expected preferences. One state experienced a large natural 
disaster that was directly linked to hydraulic fracturing operations in the state. This 
certainly could be expected to pushed public opinion further against hydraulic 
fracturing than could otherwise be expected. Several other states had smaller 
accidents that were also determined to be a result of hydraulic fracturing, which had 
a similar impact upon public opinion. These types of accidents push public opinion 
in one direction and the state’s government can be expected follow this trend, which 
in many of the above cases resulted helps explain in legislation that did not match 
expected preferences.  
Other states in the study occupy unique positions due towere affected by the 
intensity and duration of the conversation around hydraulic fracturing within their 
borders. Hydraulic fracturing has been a political topic throughout the country for 
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some years but, like any national issue, certain parts of the country have a more 
direct connection to the issue and thus they discuss it more frequently. This is 
particularly true of hydraulic fracturing because there are no national standards and 
the issue is left largely to the states to legislate. States that have larger deposits of 
natural gas have naturally led discussions of hydraulic fracturing. This has led to 
more knowledge of the topic and more comprehensive bills that address a larger 
variety of topics pertaining to hydraulic fracturing. The opposite is also true: states 
that have not had as much exposure to hydraulic fracturing, likely because they have 
smaller deposits of natural gas, passed bills that did not address hydraulic fracturing 
as specifically.  
Broadly speaking, this study can conclude that factors other than ideology 
play a large role in determining a government’s actions regarding disclosure in 
hydraulic fracturing legislation. Extra-governmental groups, geography, and 
negative incidents linked specifically to hydraulic fracturing can all push public 
opinion. During 2012-2013 it is possible to conclude that these exogenous factors 
played a larger role in determining the type of legislation that a government 
produced.  than didThese factors should be given particular consideration  ideology 
because more bills were passed that did not match expected preferences than those 
that did.  This offers compelling evidence that partisan preferences are not the sole 
determination, nor the most influential, in determining legislative outcomes.  
This study chose to analyze the question of disclosure in 2012-2013 because 
this combination of focus area and time frame represents the future of the hydraulic 
fracturing debate in the US. The study took the most recent legislation available in 
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order to ensure up to date information. It chose to focus on disclosure because this 
has emerged in recent years as a new trend in environmental regulation.  
The study relied on conclusions that can be drawn based upon theoretically 
expected preferences of Democrats and Republicans compared to their 
demonstrable legislative actions. If the study were repeated it would examine extra-
governmental factors in each case more closely. Significant information could be 
added to the analysis through examination of floor statements made by individual 
legislators or public statements from interest groups regarding the bills under 
consideration. The study would also continue its analysis over time, adding bills 
from 2014 and years to come. Disclosure has been characterized as the direction 
that hydraulic fracturing legislation will take and increasing the analysis for 
upcoming years would address this claim.  
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